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Discrimination, the Speech That Enables It, and 
the First Amendment 
Helen Norton† 
Imagine that you’re interviewing for your dream job, only to be 
asked by the hiring committee whether you’re pregnant. Or HIV-
positive. Or Muslim. Does the First Amendment protect your interview-
ers’ inquiries from government regulation? This Article explores that 
question.1 
Antidiscrimination laws forbid employers, housing providers, in-
surers, lenders, and other gatekeepers from relying on certain charac-
teristics in their decision-making.2 Many of these laws also regulate 
those actors’ speech by prohibiting them from inquiring about appli-
cants’ protected class characteristics;3 these provisions seek to stop ille-
gal discrimination before it occurs by preventing gatekeepers from elic-
iting information that would enable them to discriminate. Although 
 
 †  Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, University of Colorado 
School of Law. Thanks to Bethany Reece, Jessica Reed-Baum, Virginia Sargent, and Jonathan 
Smith for outstanding research, and to the University of Chicago Legal Forum for excellent edito-
rial assistance. Thanks too for thoughtful comments from Rachel Arnow-Richman, Rebecca Aviel, 
Amal Bass, Alan Chen, Terry Fromson, Beto Juarez, Margot Kaminski, Margaret Kwoka, Vicki 
Schultz, Nantiya Ruan, Derigan Silver, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Catherine Smith, and the par-
ticipants at the Colloquium on Scholarship on Employment and Labor Law at Texas A&M School 
of Law, the Free Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School, and the symposium on 
What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, at the University of Chicago Law School. 
 1 I explored related issues in earlier work. Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The 
First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 727 (2003). As this Article explains, a great deal has since changed. Among other things, 
legislatures increasingly regulate gatekeepers’ reliance on and inquiries about certain character-
istics to achieve equality and other public welfare goals. See infra notes 22–52 and accompanying 
text. And the antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law increasingly inspires certain litigants 
to attack related efforts. See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 2 In this Article, I use the terms “gatekeepers” and “decisionmakers” interchangeably to de-
scribe those individuals and institutions empowered to select among applicants for important op-
portunities and services. 
 3 In this Article, I use the terms “protected characteristic” and “protected class status” inter-
changeably to refer to attributes that a legislature has protected from discrimination by forbidding 
gatekeepers from relying on those attributes when distributing important opportunities and ser-
vices. 
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these laws generated little if any First Amendment controversy for dec-
ades, they now face new constitutional attacks inspired by the antiregu-
latory turn in the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Clause doctrine.4 
Part I of this Article starts by describing how gatekeepers’ inquiries 
about applicants’ protected characteristics enable illegal discrimina-
tion. It then outlines the wide variety of efforts by federal, state, and 
local legislatures to tackle thorny problems of inequality by restricting 
gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics. Next, 
it identifies the potential collision course between these measures and 
the recent antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law and litigation. 
Part II examines the theory and doctrine that support these laws’ 
constitutionality, explaining why the government’s restriction of the 
speech that enables conduct that the government has legitimately reg-
ulated triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. More specifically, the 
First Amendment permits the government to restrict speech that initi-
ates or accomplishes conduct that the government has regulated—
speech that does something and not just says something, to use legal 
scholar Kent Greenawalt’s vocabulary.5 As an illustration of speech that 
is unprotected because it initiates or accomplishes illegal conduct, the 
Court has repeatedly pointed to gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal 
discrimination: “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from 
discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will re-
quire an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants Only’ 
hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the 
employer’s speech rather than conduct.”6 
In other words, a gatekeeper’s statement “White Applicants Only” 
is unprotected because it declares certain transactions and opportuni-
ties as off limits to protected class members; precisely because of gate-
keepers’ power, their speech in these transactional settings thus does 
something and not just says something. Once we understand why the 
First Amendment does not protect those statements, we can see that 
the First Amendment similarly permits the government to regulate 
gatekeepers’ transaction-related inquiries about candidates’ protected 
class status—inquiries that enable illegal discrimination by deterring 
candidates based on their protected class status as well as by eliciting 
the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory decisions. 
 
 4 See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of this turn. 
 5 See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF 
SPEECH 6 (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 59 (1989). 
 6 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006); see also Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (offering “White Applicants Only” as an example of speech that is 
unprotected by the First Amendment as incidental to illegal conduct). 
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Part II next explains how the Court’s longstanding commercial 
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activ-
ity. It then applies this doctrine to the antidiscrimination laws identi-
fied in Part I, concluding that the government’s restriction of gatekeep-
ers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status triggers no First 
Amendment scrutiny because those inquiries constitute commercial 
speech related to the illegal activity of discriminatory employment, 
housing, and other transactions. 
Part III briefly considers the First Amendment implications of 
other antidiscrimination provisions that regulate transactional parties’ 
speech in various ways, sometimes by restricting speech and sometimes 
by requiring it. It shows how here too the Court’s commercial speech 
doctrine provides the relevant analysis, with its focus on protecting 
speech that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests while permit-
ting the regulation of speech that frustrates those interests. 
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS THAT PROHIBIT GATEKEEPERS’ 
RELIANCE ON, AND INQUIRIES ABOUT, APPLICANTS’ PROTECTED 
CHARACTERISTICS 
As this Part explains, gatekeepers’ inquiries that elicit candidates’ 
protected class status facilitate illegally discriminatory decisions about 
important opportunities and deter candidates from pursuing those op-
portunities.7 Legislatures thus often enact laws prohibiting gatekeepers 
not only from relying on, but also from inquiring about, applicants’ pro-
tected class status to stop illegal discrimination before it happens. Leg-
islatures’ interest in stopping discrimination before the fact is espe-
cially strong because after-the-fact enforcement is frequently slow, 
costly, and ineffective. 
A. How Gatekeepers’ Inquiries About Applicants’ Protected Charac-
teristics Enable Illegal Discrimination 
Information about applicants’ protected characteristics enables 
gatekeepers to discriminate, intentionally or otherwise, against those 
applicants. When gatekeepers know (or think they know) candidates’ 
race, gender, or other protected characteristic, they too often rely on 
that information to discriminate in their decisions about jobs, housing, 
credit, and other opportunities and services.8 Consider, for instance, a 
 
 7 See infra notes 8–21 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Ignacio N. Cofone, Antidiscriminatory Privacy, 72 SMU L. REV. 139, 149–51 (2019) (de-
scribing when and how gatekeepers’ access to information about candidates’ protected class status 
fosters discrimination); Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. 
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Harvard Business School study, which found that Airbnb hosts used 
information collected and shared by Airbnb to discriminate against pro-
spective guests with “distinctively African-American names.”9 In the 
same vein, Facebook recently settled complaints filed by nonprofit civil 
rights organizations alleging that Facebook used information about its 
users’ protected class status to enable housing providers to steer users 
to—or away from—certain housing opportunities based on that sta-
tus.10 
Gatekeepers often acquire the information that enables discrimi-
nation by asking candidates about their protected class status in appli-
cations, interviews, negotiations, and more. Sometimes decisionmakers 
intentionally seek information about candidates’ protected characteris-
tics to inform their discriminatory decision-making. For example, a 
Congressional committee report on the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) explained: 
Historically, employment application forms and employment in-
terviews requested information concerning an applicant’s phys-
ical or mental condition. This information was often used to ex-
clude applicants with disabilities—particularly those with so-
called hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, diabetes, emotional 
illness, heart disease, and cancer—before their ability to per-
form the job was even evaluated.11 
Even when gatekeepers seek this information for benign rather than 
nefarious purposes, that information, once obtained, remains available 
 
& MARY L. REV. 2097, 2143–46 (2015) (offering examples of how decisionmakers have used previ-
ously unknown information about applicants’ age, religion, national origin, disability, gender at 
birth, and other protected characteristics to discriminate against those applicants). 
 9 Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence From a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 1–2 (2017) (finding 
that prospective guests “with distinctively African-American names are 16 percent less likely to 
be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively white names”); see also OLIVIER SYLVAIN, 
DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON USER DATA 13–14 (2018) (describing how Airbnb elicited information 
from prospective guests that permitted prospective “hosts” to rely on “illicit biases—against, say, 
Latinos or blacks—that do not accurately predict a prospective guest’s reliability as a tenant. In 
this way Airbnb’s service directly reinforces discrimination when it requires users to share infor-
mation that suggests their own race”). 
 10 See Settlement Agreement and Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18 Civ. 
2689 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-SIGNE
D-NFHA-FB-Settlement-Agreement-00368652x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRJ7-4LE6]; Sum-
mary of Settlements Between Civil Rights Advocates and Facebook, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/3.18.2019_joint_statemen
t_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K93A-XAZH]. 
 11 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990). 
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for the gatekeeper’s later use, consciously or unconsciously, in screen-
ing, selecting, or compensating applicants.12 
And once discrimination does occur, efforts to identify and rectify 
it after the fact are notoriously slow, costly, and difficult. Complaint-
driven enforcement—that is, an enforcement regime that relies on indi-
viduals to file claims after they believe they have suffered illegal dis-
crimination—is poorly-equipped to redress discriminatory selection 
practices and other front-end discrimination. In part, this is because an 
applicant denied a job or an apartment seldom receives a reason for her 
rejection from a potential employer or landlord and is unlikely ever to 
learn the successful candidate’s identity, much less his comparative 
qualifications or other relevant attributes.13 Other factors that contrib-
ute to the ineffectiveness of after-the-fact enforcement include the lim-
itations of overworked and underfunded enforcement agencies, chal-
lengers’ difficulties in securing legal representation, and a wide range 
of procedural, evidentiary, and doctrinal barriers to proving a deci-
sionmaker’s discriminatory intent.14 For these reasons, legal scholar 
Cynthia Estlund describes antidiscrimination law’s dependence on af-
ter-the-fact enforcement as its “Achilles’ heel.”15 The greater the barri-
ers to effective after-the-fact enforcement of civil rights protections, the 
greater the value in preventing discrimination before the fact by deny-
ing gatekeepers the information that enables them to discriminate. As 
 
 12 See Roberts, supra note 8, at 2122 (“If an employer cannot access a particular kind of infor-
mation, she cannot discriminate on the basis of that information. However, once an employer ac-
quires the ability to discriminate, the knowledge of an employee’s protected status may influence 
the employer’s decisions in conscious, as well as unconscious, ways.”). 
 13 See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Lia-
bility Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1996) (“In the absence of an 
obvious motive or a relevant comparison group, potential plaintiffs have a difficult time recogniz-
ing that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred, let alone convincing a court of that fact.”). 
 14 See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON, & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: 
HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 13 (2017) (documenting how 
and why “only a tiny fraction of possible targets of workplace discrimination take formal action 
[and when they do] they are likely to settle or lose”); Charlotte S. Alexander, #MeToo and the 
Litigation Funnel, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 17 (2019) (documenting plaintiffs’ difficulties in 
winning claims under Title VII); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimi-
nation Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) (finding 
that Title VII plaintiffs who file in federal court are less successful than plaintiffs in other types 
of cases); Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Dis-
crimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1282–83 (2012) (“Indeed, of every 100 discrimination 
plaintiffs who litigate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily dismiss their 
claims), only 4 achieve any form (de minimis or not) of relief.”); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private 
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1409–
10 (1998) (explaining “the ironies of a complaint-based [approach to civil rights enforcement], 
namely that many, perhaps even a majority, of discrimination claims are missed because the dis-
crimination occurs in the contract formation when claims are significantly less likely to be filed”). 
 15 Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 349 
(2016). 
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law professor Ignacio Cofone observes, “[d]iscrimination is better 
avoided than compensated.”16 
Moreover, because these inquiries are generally made of a less pow-
erful applicant by a more powerful gatekeeper, a candidate’s response 
may be coerced: either she gives the requested information and risks 
discrimination if the gatekeeper relies on that information to withhold 
opportunities, or she refuses to provide the information only to be re-
jected for the opportunity altogether.17 For instance, one employer de-
clined to hire an applicant after she refused to answer an interview 
question about her plans to have a family; one of the interviewers re-
sponded to her reticence by stating that he “did not want to hire a 
woman who would get pregnant and quit.”18 Another employer fired a 
worker when she refused to answer questions about her reproductive 
choices, questions that included “whether she was pregnant, had ever 
been pregnant, or was planning to become pregnant; whether she had 
ever had an abortion, miscarriage, or live birth, and if so, how many 
times; and whether she was on birth control and, if so, what type.”19 
Inquiries of this sort can also deter applicants from pursuing im-
portant opportunities by signaling the decisionmakers’ discriminatory 
preferences.20 Think, for instance, of an applicant with a disability: con-
fronted by an employer’s questions about her medical status or use of 
prescription drugs, she may well conclude that the job is unavailable to 
those with certain medical conditions.21 
 
 16 Cofone, supra note 8, at 140; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimina-
tion, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 374 (2008) (“Information-based antidiscrimination policies will be 
most effective at combating statistical discrimination when traditional enforcement methods are 
least effective.”). 
 17 See Adam M. Samaha & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combina-
tions, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 969 (2015) (“Don’t Ask, May Tell examples are often linked to one-
sided worries about the vulnerability of respondents to questioner power.”); id. at 938 (“[O]ne sim-
ple reason for Don’t Ask is to prevent unwelcome pressure.”). 
 18 Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the hiring com-
mittee’s acquiescence to these questions supported the conclusion that the employer had illegally 
discriminated on the basis of pregnancy in its hiring decision). 
 19 Garlitz v. Alpena Reg’l Med. Ctr., 834 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 
 20 See Samaha & Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 926 (“Questions are themselves telling, in the 
sense that statements correctly formulated as questions usually reveal something about the ques-
tioner’s interests or beliefs.”); id. at 929 (“A question is a special device for information collection: 
it is an interactive call for information that alerts an audience to the collection effort and that 
usually reveals something about the questioner . . . . Questions reveal somebody’s interest in and 
comfort with additional information on a given topic . . . .”). 
 21 See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Health, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that the ADA’s restriction on pre-employment medical inquiries and examinations 
“prevents employers from using HIV tests to deter HIV-positive applicants from applying”); see 
also SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, AIDS AND THE LAW 3–79 (6th ed. 2020) (explaining how the ADA 
protects applicants from having to disclose private medical information that makes them “vulner-
able to discrimination”). 
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B. How Legislatures Regulate Gatekeepers’ Inquiries That Enable Il-
legal Discrimination 
Legislatures often seek to prevent illegal discrimination before it 
happens by not only forbidding decisionmakers from relying on certain 
characteristics (that is, from using information about protected class 
status) in their decision-making, but also by forbidding decisionmakers 
from eliciting that information.22 Thus, antidiscrimination laws often 
regulate both gatekeepers’ conduct—that is, their decisions about how 
and to whom to distribute opportunities and services—as well as the 
speech that enables them to engage in discriminatory conduct.23 
Many of these antidiscrimination laws include provisions that pro-
hibit decisionmakers from making certain inquiries altogether.24 For 
example, Pennsylvania’s state law bars employers from relying on a va-
riety of protected characteristics in their employment decisions and also 
forbids them from “[e]licit[ing] any information . . . concerning the race, 
color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, past handicap 
or disability” of any applicant.25 After the Pregnancy Discrimination 
 
 22 See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and 
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936 (2014) (“[The ADA 
was] designed to prohibit discrimination in employment preemptively. The ADA focuses on regu-
lating the transmission of potentially stigmatizing data during the hiring phase because, as stud-
ies have found, the most common form of discrimination against individuals with disabilities is 
the denial of a job for which the individual is qualified, followed by the refusal of an interview on 
the basis of a disability.”). 
 23 As Part III discusses, legislatures can and do make different choices when drafting antidis-
crimination laws. See infra notes 151–176 and accompanying text. 
 24 Unless and until a statute provides otherwise, the default rule in American jurisdictions 
permits employers to ask whatever they wish of applicants. Other countries choose different de-
fault rules. See Matthew W. Finkin, Pay Privacy in Comparative Context, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 355, 368 (2018) (“In Germany, out of concern for employee privacy, the employer bears 
the burden to prove the question is necessary under a strict standard of relatedness to job qualifi-
cation. In America, out of concern for managerial liberty, the state bears the burden to prove the 
restriction is necessary to further a specific public end grounded in labor market outcomes.”). 
 25 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(b)(1) (West 2019). For a few of the many other 
examples, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.240(3) (West 2019) (prohibiting landlords and real estate 
agents from making “a written or oral inquiry or record of the sex, marital status, changes in 
marital status, race, religion, physical or mental disability, color, or national origin of a person 
seeking to buy, lease, or rent real property”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502(1)(a) (2019) (same); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(C)(6) (2019) (prohibiting owners or others engaging in a real estate 
transaction from making “a record or inquiry in connection with a prospective real estate transac-
tion, which indicates, directly or indirectly, an intent to make a limitation, specification, or dis-
crimination” based on an unrelated disability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A(1)(A) (2019) 
(prohibiting landlords, owners or agents who are renting or selling housing from making “any 
written or oral inquiry concerning the race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental 
disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status of any prospective purchaser, occu-
pant or tenant”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-318(5) (2019) (making it unlawful to “cause to be made any 
written or oral inquiry or record concerning the race, color, religion, national origin, handicap, 
familial status, or sex of a person seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10:5-12(c) (West 2019) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into “race, creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual 
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Act26 amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to make clear that illegal 
job discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination based 
on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”27 the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted the statute to pro-
hibit most employer inquiries about applicants’ pregnancy status.28 As 
another illustration, the decades-old Equal Credit Opportunity Act reg-
ulations forbid lenders from asking about applicants’ race, national 
origin, sex, religion, marital status, and reproductive decisions to pre-
vent illegally discriminatory credit decisions.29 
Some antidiscrimination laws instead regulate inquiries about pro-
tected characteristics at certain key junctures in the decision-making 
process. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for instance, pro-
hibits employers from relying on disability status in their decision-mak-
ing, and prohibits certain disability-related inquiries at various stages 
in the employment process to prevent discrimination from infecting em-
ployers’ ultimate decision-making. More specifically, the ADA starts by 
forbidding employers from asking “whether such applicant is an indi-
vidual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability” 
before extending any job offer; instead, an employer “may make 
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-
related functions.”30 After an applicant receives a conditional job offer 
but before she begins work, her employer may pose disability-related 
inquiries regardless of their job-relatedness, so long as the employer 
makes the same inquiries of all new employees in the same job cate-
gory.31 Finally, after an employee has started work, an employer may 
 
orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, pregnancy or breastfeeding, or 
sex” or military status); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(d) (West 2019) (same). 
 26 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k). 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 28 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2019) (“Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective em-
ployment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as 
to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.”); see also King 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[Q]uestions about pregnancy 
and childbearing would be unlawful per se [under Title VII] in the absence of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification.”); Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc. 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004) 
(denying defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment in light of evidence that it had asked 
questions about the plaintiff’s marital status, parental status, and plans to have children, ques-
tions that constituted a per se Title VII violation). 
 29 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019) (“A creditor shall not inquire about the race, color, religion, 
national origin, or sex of an applicant or any other person in connection with a credit transac-
tion.”); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into the marital status of applicants 
for certain types of credit); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b)(2) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’ 
sex); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(3) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’ “birth control practices, 
intentions concerning the bearing or rearing of children, or capability to bear children”). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2012). 
 31 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012). An employer may then rescind an individual’s conditional 
offer only when the exclusionary decision is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). 
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ask only those disability-related questions that are “job-related and con-
sistent with business necessity.”32 
Some antidiscrimination laws prohibit not only gatekeepers’ direct 
inquiries of applicants, but also their efforts to learn about applicants’ 
protected characteristics from other sources. For instance, the federal 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)33—which bars 
health insurers and employers from relying on, and asking about, ge-
netic information in making insurance and employment decisions—
“generally prohibits employers from seeking to obtain genetic infor-
mation at any time during employment and, notably, the GINA’s imple-
mentation regulations explicitly apply to the Internet.”34 Similarly, 
some states forbid employers from “seek[ing] [or] obtain[ing]” appli-
cants’ protected class information “from any source.”35 
Although many of these antidiscrimination laws prohibit deci-
sionmakers’ reliance on, and often their inquiries about, characteristics 
long thought immutable (like race or national origin),36 newer measures 
reflect legislatures’ expanding understanding of the wide variety of bar-
riers to equality. A growing number of state and local jurisdictions now 
prohibit employers from relying on, and asking about, applicants’ sex-
ual orientation and gender identity.37 Commentators hail GINA—
 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2012) (limiting employers’ ability to “request, require, or purchase 
genetic information” of potential employees and current employees or their family members); see 
also id. (defining genetic information to include genetic test results for applicants and their family 
members as well as family medical history); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(b)(11) (West 2019) 
(prohibiting employers’ inquiry into applicants’ genetic information); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 711(e) (2019) (same). 
 34 Paul-Emile, supra note 22, at 937; see also id. at 938 (“This provision includes searches of 
court records and medical databases. Although the law outlines certain limited exceptions, includ-
ing inadvertent acquisition, the EEOC regulations emphasize that receipt of genetic information 
will not generally be considered inadvertent unless the employer instructs the source of the mate-
rial to exclude genetic information. The law also includes safe harbor language for commercial or 
publicly available information; however, covered employers are precluded from searching such 
sources with the intention of acquiring an individual’s genetic information.”). 
 35 See MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 subd. 4(2) (2017) (prohibiting an employer from “seek[ing] and 
obtain[ing] for purposes of making a job decision, information from any source that pertains to” 
the applicant’s protected characteristics). 
 36 See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 476 (2010) (“When invoked within antidiscrimina-
tion law, immutability stands for the proposition that entities should not discriminate on the basis 
of traits that a person did not choose and cannot change or control without serious cost.”). 
 37 E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a), (d) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on, and inquiries 
into, an applicant’s or employee’s sexual orientation, marital status, and other protected charac-
teristics); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a), (d) (2017) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into 
an applicant’s sexual orientation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohib-
iting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s sexual orientation and gender identity); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1), (3) (West 2018) (same); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03 subd. 44, 
363A.08 subd. 2, subd. 4(a)(1) (2017) (same); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(i), (ii), (4)(i), (iii) (2017) 
(same). 
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enacted by Congress in 2008 with a near-unanimous vote—as particu-
larly innovative in its determination to stamp out genetic discrimina-
tion before a discriminatory culture had the time to develop by prohib-
iting decisionmakers’ reliance on, and inquiries about, applicants’ 
genetic information.38 And many other recent antidiscrimination laws 
prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on, and often inquiries about, certain life 
experiences like applicants’ marital or reproductive choices,39 current 
unemployment status,40 credit histories,41 status as domestic violence 
victims,42 certain arrest records,43 and veteran status.44 Some bar reli-
ance on, or inquiries about, these sorts of characteristics to achieve pub-
lic policy objectives in addition to equality goals. For example, “ban-the-
box” laws limit employers’ inquiries about applicants’ criminal record 
at various points in the employment process in part because of the evi-
dence that ex-offenders’ unemployment strongly predicts their risk of 
recidivism.45 
 
 38 See Roberts, supra note 36, at 441 (“[GINA’s proponents presented the legislation] as a 
unique opportunity to stop discrimination before it starts. It is this preemptive nature, basing 
protection on future—rather than past or even present—discrimination, that truly makes GINA 
novel.”); see also id. at 472–73 (“[T]he fear of genetic-information discrimination was preventing 
many potential research subjects from participating in studies, thereby slowing the rate at which 
genetic technology could progress” and “supporters of genetic antidiscrimination legislation also 
maintained that the fear of genetic tests was harming the general public—people were not seeking 
diagnoses and treatments that could improve or sustain their health. For example, one-third of 
the women offered a genetic test related to breast cancer declined, citing potential discrimination 
as the reason.”). 
 39 E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(3) (West 2019) (forbidding employers’ inquiries into 
employees’ marital status); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(d) (West 2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
19, § 711(j) (2016) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against applicants or employees 
based on their reproductive health decisions); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 70459 (Feb. 1, 2017) (pro-
hibiting employers’ reliance on and inquiries into applicants’ “reproductive health decisions or 
pregnancy”). 
 40 E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1362 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against appli-
cants because of their current unemployment); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 8-107(21) (2019) (same). 
 41 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320 (West 2018) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into ap-
plicants’ credit history). 
 42 E.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-504 (West 2014) (prohibiting insurers from discriminating 
against applicants because they have been victims of domestic violence); N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW 
§ 227-d (McKinney 2016) (prohibiting housing providers from discriminating against applicants 
because they have been victims of domestic violence). 
 43 E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and 
inquiries into applicants’ arrest records); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(a), (b), (d) (West 2017) 
(prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s expunged juvenile record). 
 44 E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against members 
of the uniformed services by relying on military status when making employment decisions). 
 45 See Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1082 
(2019) (explaining that “ban-the-box” laws seek to address the “grim situation [that] has emerged 
in which the very people who most need to work—both for their own benefit and for the benefit of 
society as a whole—often experience tremendous difficulty finding gainful employment”); see also 
Genevieve Douglas, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws Finding Inroads in Red States, Too, BLOOMBERG LAW 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/ban-the-box-laws-finding-
inroads-in-red-states-too [https://perma.cc/TB7T-A5ZY] (“Nearly one in three adults in the U.S. 
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As another illustration, state and local legislatures have recently 
begun to deploy related strategies when wrestling with tenacious gen-
der- and race-based pay disparities.46 More specifically, a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions now prohibit employers from relying on, and inquir-
ing about, applicants’ salary history in making decisions about hiring 
and pay. Concluding that candidates’ prior pay too often reflects race or 
gender discrimination or other factors unrelated to merit,47 these poli-
cymakers challenge many employers’ reliance on the (often inaccurate) 
assumption that prior pay is an accurate measure of a candidate’s skill, 
experience, and responsibility to reject applicants whose past salaries 
are perceived as too low.48 These policymakers also seek to address the 
even more common practice in which employers base workers’ starting 
pay on how much those workers earned at their last job49—a practice 
that ensures that pay disparities continue to follow women and people 
of color from job to job.50 For all these reasons, these policymakers reject 
 
has an arrest or conviction record that can show up on an employment background check, accord-
ing to the National Employment Law Project. That makes the potential impact on the labor market 
huge for more widespread ban the box measures.”). 
 46 See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows & The Future of Pay Equity, 
120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 553 (2020) (“According to the latest report from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
American women still earn an average of 80 to 83 cents for every dollar earned by their male 
counterparts.”). The pay gap is even greater for women of color. Id. 
 47 E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a), (b) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into 
an applicant’s “salary history information”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(b) (West 2017) (pro-
hibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s “compensation history”); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 378-2.4(a) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance and inquiries into an applicant’s “salary his-
tory”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and in-
quiries into an applicant’s “wage or salary history”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a(1) (McKinney 2020) 
(prohibiting all employers from seeking, requesting or relying upon “wage or salary history” from 
an applicant); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495m(a) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries 
into an applicant’s “current or past compensation”). Similar legislation is currently pending in 
Congress and several other states and localities. E.g., Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. 
§ 10 (2019) (proposing to prohibit employers from relying upon “wage, salary, and benefit history” 
in their hiring or pay decisions and from seeking prospective employees’ “wage, salary, and benefit 
history”). 
 48 See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. as Amicus Curiae supporting 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 
F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176) (“By prohibiting employers from inquiring about 
[or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary history law] denies them useful information for 
evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring process.”). 
 49 See PAYSCALE, THE SALARY HISTORY QUESTION: ALTERNATIVES FOR RECRUITERS AND 
HIRING MANAGERS 3 (2017) (reporting the study’s results that showed 43 percent of job applicants 
were asked about prior pay at some point during the application process); Elizabeth Lester-
Abdalla, Salary History Should be Her Story: Upholding Regulations of Salary History through a 
Commercial Speech Analysis, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 703 (2018) (“When hiring a new em-
ployee, Fresno County takes the new hire’s most recent salary and increases it by about 5 percent 
to place them on a level within the County’s salary classification bracket.”); Valentina Zarya, Am-
azon Joins Growing List of Employers That Won’t Ask About Your Salary History, FORTUNE (Jan. 
18, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/01/18/amazon-salary-history-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/9NK
L-CDQY] (explaining how Google and other large companies are no longer asking about applicants’ 
salary history, sometimes in response to jurisdictions’ enactment of salary history laws). 
 50 See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male 
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the assumption that a worker’s salary history necessarily reflects an 
accurate assessment of, and reward for, her job performance.51 
In sum, all of these antidiscrimination laws reflect legislatures’ 
conclusions that relying on (and thus asking about) certain character-
istics or experiences when distributing important opportunities is mor-
ally wrong, instrumentally unwise, or both.52 
C. New First Amendment Challenges to These Laws 
Hundreds of federal, state, and local laws now protect certain char-
acteristics from discrimination by prohibiting gatekeepers from both re-
lying on, and also asking about, those characteristics. Sometimes these 
measures generate heated political opposition from regulated entities 
who resist regulation they characterize as disruptive.53 This is nothing 
new. As one of many examples, some employers opposed the enactment 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law barring job 
discrimination based on race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.54 
And some business owners and associations opposed enactment of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, including its protections for HIV-
 
Students, 109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT. ACADEMY OF SCI. 16474 (2012) (describing the results of 
a randomized double-blind study that found that decisionmakers often pay women less than men 
even from the very beginning of their careers when there are no differences in male and female 
workers’ experience, education, or family caregiving responsibilities: the study’s participants of-
fered an average starting salary of approximately $30,000 for the male candidate but only about 
$26,000 for the identically-qualified female candidate). 
 51 See BENJAMIN HARRIS, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, INFORMATION IS POWER: FOSTERING 
LABOR MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH TRANSPARENT WAGES 9 (2018) (citing research that em-
ployers’ initial wage offers were higher by nine percent when those employers could not ask about 
applicants’ salary history); Lobel, supra note 46, at 573 (“The first negotiation difference, which I 
call the negotiation deficit, is that women negotiate less frequently and ask for less when they do. 
This deficit can be mitigated, though not erased, with a salary inquiry ban. The salary inquiry ban 
has the potential to positively shift the process from letting job applicants lead with a starting 
point figure to employers implementing a practice of more actively suggesting a fair salary.”); id. 
(“Salary inquiry bans can also counteract the negative assumptions employers may make when 
women refuse to reveal their prior salary in a regime that allows salary inquiry. This is a separate 
effect, which I call the negative inference—when employers assume women who refuse to disclose 
their pay earn less.”). 
 52 And the more that legislatures address arbitrary barriers to employment and other im-
portant opportunities, the more inclusive their choices become, and the more those choices may 
appeal to those on both the political right and the left. See ROBIN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS: 
RETHINKING THEIR NATURAL FOUNDATION 83 (2019) (urging that we embrace a broader under-
standing of the civil right to employment as one that should not be denied for any irrational reason 
unrelated to performance). 
 53 See infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text (describing certain business associations’ op-
position to Philadelphia’s salary history law). 
 54 See CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
220 (2014) (describing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s warning that Title VII “could be seriously 
harmful to the conduct of American business” and requesting “that Title VII be stripped from the 
[Civil Rights Act]; if that was not possible, then it should be limited to a role of conciliation and 
persuasion”). 
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positive workers.55 Yet disrupting gatekeepers’ practices that legisla-
tures have identified as harmful is precisely the point of these efforts. 
Recall Justice Brandeis’s memorable explanation of the power and 
value of legislative experimentation in responding to pressing prob-
lems: 
[T]here must be power in the states and the nation to remold, 
through experimentation, our economic practices and institu-
tions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot be-
lieve that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the 
states which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to 
correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess pro-
ductive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts. 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught 
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.56 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized legislatures’ 
constitutional power to challenge and change longstanding practices 
judged to be unjust, inefficient, or both. This includes state and local 
jurisdictions’ constitutional power to regulate the terms and conditions 
of employment and other transactions (subject only to rational basis 
scrutiny),57 as well as Congress’s Article I interstate commerce clause 
 
 55 See LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST U.S. MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 161–216 (2015) (describing some 
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to the ADA); id. at 171–73, 204–16 (describing some 
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to extending ADA protections to HIV-positive work-
ers). 
 56 New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The 
majority opinion’s abrogation was recognized in Wolverine Fireworks Display v. Towne, No. 12-
10426, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63259 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 57 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018) 
(“It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes 
of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and 
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”); Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas 
Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1983) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Kansas 
law that regulated gas prices as a proper use of police power based on “significant and legitimate 
state interests . . . to protect consumers”); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines, 
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (concluding that state antidiscrimination law does not unconstitu-
tionally burden interstate commerce); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423–25 
(1952) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Missouri law that prohibited employers from de-
ducting wages from employees for taking time out for voting); Railway Mail Ass’n. v. Corsi, 326 
U.S. 88, 94 (1945) (holding that there is “no constitutional basis for the contention that a state 
cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed”); West Coast Hotel 
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power to regulate these matters through federal legislation (again, sub-
ject only to rational basis review).58 When a legislature bars gatekeep-
ers from relying on certain characteristics in distributing opportunities 
and services, it requires those gatekeepers to use what it believes to be 
better indicia of candidates’ ability and merit. Regardless of whether 
one agrees with a specific legislature’s conclusions, whether and when 
legislatures should choose to regulate employers’, lenders’, insurers’, 
and housing providers’ decision-making is a policy question rather than 
a constitutional question. In other words, legislatures’ constitutional 
power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on credit history, salary his-
tory, or certain other experiences and histories is no different from its 
constitutional power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on character-
istics like race, religion, or gender. 
Again, antidiscrimination law prohibits gatekeepers from relying 
on information about certain characteristics in their decision-making 
when the legislature concludes that such reliance is unfair, unwise, or 
both. And once legislatures so regulate, it then makes sense for them to 
restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries eliciting the information that enables 
what is now illegal discrimination.59 
 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, 
the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable pro-
tection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations 
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.”). 
 58 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Congress’s Article I power 
to prohibit public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of race); Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Congress’s Article I power to regulate the terms and conditions of em-
ployment through the National Labor Relations Act). 
 59 Note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not resolve the ques-
tion whether a baker has a Free Speech Clause right to discriminate on the basis of his customers’ 
sexual orientation in providing certain (arguably expressive) goods and services. See Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719 (concluding instead that state agency had demonstrated hostility 
towards the baker’s religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause). If (and only if) some 
decisionmakers do have a constitutional right to discriminate in some circumstances, then pre-
sumably they would then have the constitutional right to speak in related ways, perhaps by asking 
applicants and customers questions about their protected class status. But, as the Court has re-
peatedly made clear, gatekeepers generally do not have a constitutional right to discriminate on 
the basis of protected characteristics. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (re-
jecting law firm’s claim that Title VII’s requirement that it refrain from sex discrimination in its 
partnership decisions violated its First Amendment rights); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (rejecting nonprofit organization’s claim that state law prohibiting discrimi-
natory conduct by public accommodations violated its First Amendment rights); Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (rejecting business owner’s constitu-
tional challenge to the Civil Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations 
based on his view that racial integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”). The Supreme Court has 
recognized exceptions to this general rule in certain limited circumstances outside of the commer-
cial setting. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000) (holding that the First 
Amendment’s implied freedom of association permitted the Boy Scouts of America to exclude gay 
Scoutmasters despite state public accommodations law that prohibited discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation). 
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Until very recently these laws generated little, if any, constitu-
tional controversy. But the contemporary antiregulatory turn in First 
Amendment law and litigation has emboldened new attacks on govern-
mental efforts to address sticky problems of inequality through the 
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above. This turn—character-
ized by some as the “weaponization” of the First Amendment60—has 
been described at length elsewhere,61 and includes corporate and other 
commercial entities’ increasingly successful efforts to resist regulation 
in a variety of settings. 
Most relevant to this Article, the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of 
Commerce [hereinafter “Philadelphia Chamber”] recently challenged 
Philadelphia’s salary history law that prohibits employers from relying 
on, and asking about, applicants’ prior pay when making hiring and 
compensation decisions.62 In so doing, the Philadelphia Chamber and 
other industry associations made several sweeping arguments inspired 
by the Court’s antiregulatory turn, arguing that the First Amendment 
protects gatekeepers’ ability both to rely on, and ask about, salary his-
tory when choosing among and compensating applicants for available 
job opportunities.63 If accepted, these arguments would also threaten 
many other antidiscrimination laws, both longstanding and new. 
Most aggressively, the Philadelphia Chamber claimed that Phila-
delphia’s law unconstitutionally restricted employers’ ability to express 
their view—through their actual employment decisions—that salary 
history is relevant to workers’ merit. As its brief argued, “[a]n employer 
who relies on an applicant’s wage history when formulating a proposed 
salary is communicating a message about how much that applicant’s 
 
 60 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “weaponizing the First Amendment, in 
a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory pol-
icy”); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrench-
ment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2161 (2018) (“The Supreme Court’s ‘weaponized’ First Amendment 
has been its strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaign-finance regulation, 
public-sector union financing, and pharmaceutical regulation, and threatening a broader remit.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amend-
ment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First 
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2018); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: 
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016). 
 62 See Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Greater Phila. Chamber of 
Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 2018) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176). 
 63 The Third Circuit recently denied the Philadelphia Chamber’s request for a preliminary 
injunction of the city’s provision forbidding employers from relying on prior pay in hiring and com-
pensation decisions as well as the city’s provision forbidding employers from asking about appli-
cants’ prior pay. Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–
36 (3d Cir. 2020). I note that I served pro bono as co-counsel on behalf of amici civil rights organi-
zations defending Philadelphia’s law. See Brief for Women’s Law Project, et al. as Amicus Curiae 
supporting Philadelphia, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 
116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176). 
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labor is worth to the employer: the higher the proposed salary, the more 
valuable the applicant is to the employer.”64 The Philadelphia Chamber 
thus characterized the government’s regulation of employers’ reliance 
on information in its hiring and pay decisions as the regulation of speech 
that should trigger, and fail, heightened scrutiny.65 Indeed, the lawsuit 
described the entire statute not as a regulation of commercial conduct 
that triggers only rational basis review, but instead as a regulation of 
speech based on “disagreement with employers’ message that an em-
ployer’s assessment of a prospective employee’s appropriate salary, as 
reflected in the employer’s salary offer, can be informed by the prospec-
tive employee’s salary history.”66 In other words, the Philadelphia 
Chamber’s lawsuit attacked the government’s constitutional power to 
regulate discriminatory conduct by restricting gatekeepers’ use of cer-
tain information in distributing important opportunities. 
Some businesses and employers in 1964 similarly resisted enact-
ment and enforcement of the Civil Rights Act because they felt that re-
quiring them not to discriminate on the basis of race interfered with 
their ability to communicate their views about race.67 And some employ-
ers argued that their assessment of an applicant’s suitability or value 
is, and should be, informed by sexual orientation or other characteris-
tics now increasingly protected from discrimination by law.68 Many em-
ployers believed the same about pregnancy or disability or age because 
they felt that those characteristics predict workers’ cost or ability; some 
continue to believe it.69 And some employers no doubt think the same 
about credit history or arrest record or salary history—i.e., they believe 
 
 64 Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 62, at 29. 
 65 Id. at 25–27. 
 66 Id. at 16. But as described infra notes 94, 99, 100, 102–104 and accompanying text, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the First Amendment does not protect a gate-
keeper’s statement “White Applicants Only,” even though this speech also communicates a mes-
sage about the value a prospective employer places on certain applicants because of their protected 
class status. 
 67 See Newman, supra note 59 (rejecting business owner’s constitutional challenge to the Civil 
Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations based on his view that racial 
integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”). 
 68 As an illustration, a 1950 U.S. Senate Subcommittee report argued just this. See SUBCOMM. 
ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXEC. DEP’TS, EMPLOYMENT OF 
HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. No. 81-241, at 3–4 (1950) (“In 
the opinion of this subcommittee homosexuals and other sex perverts are not proper persons to be 
employed in Government for two reasons; first, they are generally unsuitable, and second, they 
constitute security risks. . . . [I]t is generally believed that those who engage in overt acts of per-
version lack the emotional stability of normal persons. In addition, there is an abundance of evi-
dence to sustain the conclusion that indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber 
of an individual to a degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility.”). 
 69 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which employers de-
clined to hire women they feared might become pregnant). 
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that those characteristics are important to hiring and compensation de-
cisions because they might predict candidates’ ability. As we’ve seen, 
however, the Court has long made clear that legislatures have the con-
stitutional power to prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on such characteris-
tics in distributing opportunities and services once those legislatures 
conclude that such characteristics are not—or should not be—relevant 
to decision-making.70 The Third Circuit recognized this when it denied 
the Philadelphia Chamber’s request to preliminarily enjoin the provi-
sion of Philadelphia’s law that forbids employers from relying on appli-
cants’ salary history in hiring and compensation decisions.71 
The Philadelphia Chamber also specifically challenged legisla-
tures’ power to restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegal dis-
crimination. Although deployed so far to challenge laws regulating em-
ployers’ inquiries about salary history, these arguments would apply 
with equal force to the wide range of federal, state, and local statutes 
described above that prohibit gatekeepers’ questions about religion, na-
tional origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, and many other 
protected characteristics. We may anticipate similar challenges to other 
statutes, perhaps starting with laws of relatively recent vintage like 
statutes prohibiting employers from asking about, and relying upon, 
applicants’ genetic information, credit history, and reproductive deci-
sions.72 
As the next Part explains, these challenges should not succeed. 
Once a legislature prohibits certain transactions as illegally discrimi-
natory, First Amendment theory and doctrine support the legislature’s 
choice also to restrict the speech that enables this now-illegal conduct, 
including but not limited to gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ 
protected class status. 
 
 70 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. An employer illegally relies on salary history 
when it pays a salary that relies on the candidate’s prior salary, not when it communicates this 
decision to the applicant. If communicating a salary offer that relies on a protected characteristic 
is protected speech, then the same would be true of communicating a salary offer that relies on 
other protected characteristics like religion, race, or gender. 
 71 Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–36 (3d Cir. 
2020). 
 72 As law professor Charlotte Garden has observed, “[A]lthough many of these theories are a 
stretch for now, individual deregulatory First Amendment cases should not be viewed as outliers: 
the outward push is occurring simultaneously on multiple fronts, and its standard-bearers include 
some exceedingly well-respected and influential lawyers.” Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory 
First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (2016); see also id. at 362 (“[E]ven 
First Amendment arguments that are unlikely to be accepted can matter; for example, Chicago 
reportedly considered a minimum wage ordinance modeled on Seattle’s, but abandoned it in light 
of [an industry group’s unsuccessful First Amendment challenge to Seattle’s increase in its mini-
mum wage, alleging that the increase would leave its members with less resources available to 
spend on speech activities]. . . . Thus, one problem with the emerging deregulatory First Amend-
ment is that it can accomplish some of its aims without the courts ever adopting it; the increasingly 
real threat of expensive litigation by high-profile litigators can stay regulators’ hands.”) 
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II. WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT SPEECH THAT 
ENABLES ILLEGALLY DISCRIMINATORY TRANSACTIONS 
This Part starts by examining why the First Amendment does not 
protect speech that initiates or accomplishes conduct that the govern-
ment has regulated—in other words, speech that does something and 
not just says something. It then explains how the speech that enables 
illegal conduct more generally—as well as the speech that enables ille-
gal discrimination more specifically—exemplifies speech that does 
something and not just says something. Next, this Part demonstrates 
how the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine has long captured 
this insight by holding that the First Amendment does not protect com-
mercial speech related to illegal activity such that the government’s reg-
ulation of such speech triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. It closes 
by describing this doctrine’s application to the laws described in Part I, 
concluding that the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ in-
quiries about applicants’ protected class status because those inquiries 
constitute commercial speech related to the illegal activity of discrimi-
natory employment, housing, and other transactions. 
 
A. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables 
Regulated Conduct More Generally 
The government routinely, and in a variety of settings, restricts 
speech that enables regulated conduct without triggering any First 
Amendment scrutiny. Antitrust law, for instance, “restricts the ex-
change of accurate market, pricing, and production information, as well 
as limits the advocacy of concerted action in most contexts; yet it re-
mains almost wholly untouched by the First Amendment.”73 Nor does 
the First Amendment protect solicitations of, and conspiracies to en-
gage in, illegal activity.74 
 
 73 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2004); see also id. at 1770 (“[N]o First 
Amendment-generated level of scrutiny is used to determine whether the content-based advertis-
ing restrictions of the Securities Act of 1933 are constitutional, whether corporate executives may 
be imprisoned under the Sherman Act for exchanging accurate information about proposed prices 
with their competitors, whether an organized crime leader may be prosecuted for urging that his 
subordinates murder a mob rival, or whether a chainsaw manufacturer may be held liable in a 
products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written instructions accompanying 
the tool.”). 
 74 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal 
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. . . . Many long estab-
lished criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—crim-
inalize speech (commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal activities.”); New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the 
“advertising and selling of child pornography” because they “provide an economic motive for and 
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A number of thoughtful commentators have considered this dy-
namic, explaining it as involving a sufficiently close relationship be-
tween speech and regulated conduct that leaves us confident that the 
government has targeted conduct rather than ideas. Kent Greenawalt, 
for instance, identifies a universe of what he calls “situation-altering” 
speech that falls outside of the First Amendment’s protection because 
it does something rather than just says something. In other words, this 
speech “dominantly represent[s] commitments to action” rather than 
“assertions of facts or values or expressions of feeling” that have First 
Amendment value.75 Under this view, “communications whose domi-
nant purpose is to accomplish something rather than to say something 
are not reached by a principle of free speech or are reached much less 
strongly than are ordinary claims of fact and value.”76 This approach 
explains why, for example, offers and agreements to commit a crime 
receive no First Amendment protection.77 
Expression’s capacity to do something rather than just say some-
thing can increase with the power of the speaker. This is the case, for 
example, of comparatively powerful speakers’ threats and orders: 
“[a]nother kind of situation-altering utterance is when a boss gives a 
direct order of behavior to a subordinate. That is effectively a way for 
the boss to get done what he has ordered.”78 “Such situation-altering 
utterances,” Greenawalt concludes, “are not the sort of speech that war-
rants protection under a guarantee of free speech.”79 Targeting actions 
rather than ideas, the government’s restriction of such threats and or-
ders triggers no First Amendment scrutiny.80 
 
are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the 
Nation”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972) (stating 
that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is an “integral part” of illegal conduct); 
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (“Fraud and crime-facilitating speech, for example, are thought to 
be entirely outside the bounds of the Amendment, and no balancing is required to suppress them 
in a given case.”). 
 75 GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS supra note 5; see also GREENAWALT, THE USES OF 
LANGUAGE, supra note 5 (“Thus, with some roughness, we can speak of assertions of fact and value 
as making claims about what already exists in the listener’s world. Situation-altering utterances 
purport to change that world.”); id. at 239 (describing “communications that I claim fall outside 
the coverage of the First Amendment” as “too far removed from ordinary statements of fact and 
value to deserve even moderately stringent constitutional protection”). 
 76 GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 40. 
 77 GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5. 
 78 See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Exercise by Private Individuals and Organizations, 72 
SMU L. REV. 397, 400 (2019). 
 79 GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 79. 
 80 See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 732 (2016) 
(“[W]hen speech begins to resemble conduct, such as when it impairs discrete, material interests 
through direct processes and through the fault mostly of the speaker, then courts should consider 
those conduct-like harms in their consequentialist calculus.”). 
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The government’s routine regulation of contractual and other 
transaction-related speech offers another illustration of this broader dy-
namic where the government restricts speech because it does some-
thing, and not just says something. Indeed, contract law regularly reg-
ulates transactional speech without raising First Amendment 
discussion, much less litigation.81 As law professor Rod Smolla explains, 
“[A] statement of transaction is the use of language to propose or con-
clude some form of transaction[,] [such as] ‘I will rent to you this apart-
ment if you will pay me $300 per month.’ . . . . Because virtually all 
transactions are effectuated through language, freedom of speech never 
has been thought to encompass all use of language.”82 In other words, 
once the government exercises its constitutional power to regulate cer-
tain transactions, this inevitably requires the regulation of the speech 
that makes those transactions possible: “To regulate the language is to 
regulate the transaction.”83 
Legal scholar Daniel Farber makes a similar point about speech 
that serves a contractual function, observing that “[c]ontract law con-
sists almost entirely of rules attaching liability to various uses of lan-
guage.”84 To help us determine whether the government’s regulation of 
transactional speech impermissibly targets ideas or instead permissibly 
targets conduct, Professor Farber proposes the following test: 
A justification for regulating the seller’s speech relates to the 
contractual [as opposed to informational, and thus constitution-
ally protected] function of the speech if, and only if, the state 
 
 81 See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1773 (observing as a descriptive matter that “the speech with 
which we make contracts is, in general, not within the scope of ‘the freedom of speech’ and thus 
not covered by the First Amendment”); G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 
SMU L. REV. 513, 525 (2019) (“No current court would find that the First Amendment shields false 
or misleading speech affecting the creation of a contract from exposing the speaker to contract 
damages, or speech asking another to commit a murder from criminal sanctions.”). 
 82 Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist 
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 171, 186–87 (1990); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 456–57 (1978) (describing the government’s constitutionally permissible regulation of “a 
business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component”); GREENAWALT, 
FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 83 (“Smolla’s core idea of ‘statements of transaction’ is very 
close to what I have called situation-altering utterances, remarks that do something rather than 
tell something.”). 
 83 Smolla, supra note 82, at 187; see also id. (explaining that “the laws governing the language 
that must appear on a negotiable instrument[] never have been thought to implicate freedom of 
speech”). Note that transactions may or may not be commercial, depending on whether they in-
volve the exchange of goods and services for compensation. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 298 (2008) (“Offers to provide or requests to obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a 
commercial exchange or not, are similarly undeserving of First Amendment protection. It would 
be an odd constitutional principle that permitted the government to prohibit offers to sell illegal 
drugs, but not offers to give them away for free.”). 
 84 Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 
386 (1979). 
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interest disappears when the same statements are made by a 
third person with no relation to the transaction. If the same in-
terest is implicated by the third party’s speech, the interest ob-
viously cannot relate to any contractual aspect of the speech, 
since the third party is not involved in the contract.85 
Law professor Jane Bambauer suggests a related approach for parsing 
the government’s permissible regulation of speech that does something 
from its impermissible regulation of speech because it says something, 
observing that “[w]hen the state has a legitimate, non-speech-related 
reason to manage a relationship, it will typically manage many non-
speech aspects of the relationship as well.”86 And that’s what we see 
with respect to the government’s regulation of gatekeepers’ speech, as 
the government regularly regulates the conduct of employers, lenders, 
housing providers, and other commercial actors to prevent discrimina-
tion and promote fairness and efficiency.87 
B. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables 
Illegal Discrimination More Specifically 
So far, we’ve seen that the First Amendment does not protect 
speech that accomplishes illegal conduct, nor does it protect speech that 
performs a contractual function: both involve speech that does some-
thing, not just says something. The speech that enables illegally dis-
criminatory transactions thus involves two sets of circumstances 
“where the regulation of expressive activities seems incontrovertibly 
outside the ambit of First Amendment concerns: speech in the for-
mation of contracts and speech solicitaing [sic] [illegal] activity.”88 
 
 85 Id. at 388–89. 
 86 Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1941, 1948 (2016). 
 87 As Kent Greenawalt explains: “The argument against the relevance of a free speech princi-
ple is strongest when the information disclosed is so narrowly specific that no significant subject 
of discussion or learning is involved. [The reasons for free speech protections] apply less strongly 
if speaker and listener care only about an immediate practical objective and not about any increase 
in general understanding or expression of personal feelings and attitudes.” GREENAWALT, THE 
USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 47; see also Schauer, supra note 73, at 1801 (interpreting 
Greenawalt’s argument to distinguish between speech that is “face-to-face, informational, partic-
ular, and for private gain” from speech that “is public rather than face-to-face, when it is inspired 
by the speaker’s desire for social change rather than for private gain, when it relates to something 
general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative rather than informational 
in content” and concluding that the First Amendment is “irrelevant” to the former, and “plainly” 
implicated in the latter); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1102–
05 (2005) (suggesting that the First Amendment affords greater protection to “dual-use” infor-
mation that provides information to a wide public audience even if it enables some listeners to 
commit illegal acts than it does to single or limited use information that enables the parties in one-
on-one conversations to commit illegal acts). 
 88 White, supra note 81, at 525. 
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For example, courts and commentators have long recognized (with-
out constitutional controversy) that quid pro quo harassment—in which 
an employer threatens on-the-job punishment or offers an on-the-job 
reward based on a worker’s response to unwelcome sexual advances—
is unprotected by the First Amendment.89 As Greenawalt explains more 
generally, “Since someone who orders another is not engaging in ex-
pression, but is attempting to have his way through power or authority, 
a political principle of freedom of speech is no impediment to forbidding 
undesirable orders.”90 In other words, the First Amendment permits the 
government to bar quid pro quo threats and promises because they seek 
to change the terms and conditions of employment through the 
speaker’s power over the employment relationship. 
For decades the Court has also recognized that harassing work-
place speech warrants the government’s constraint when sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment based on pro-
tected class status.91 Think, for instance, of workers regularly forced to 
endure an onslaught of racial or sexual slurs that alter the terms and 
conditions of their employment and signal certain job opportunities as 
off-limits to targeted individuals based on protected class status.92 For 
these reasons, the Court has stated that the First Amendment permits 
the content-based regulation of such verbal harassment as “incidental” 
to the government’s permissible regulation of discriminatory conduct: 
 
 89 See Nadine Strossen, The Tensions between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the 
First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 704 (1995) (“Even the most diehard free 
speech absolutist recognizes that the speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount 
to threats or extortion, expression that has long been punishable without raising substantial free 
speech concerns in any context.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that quid pro quo harassment “would seemingly be as 
unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form of threat or extortion”). 
 90 GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 85. 
 91 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 
U.S. 17 (1993). 
 92 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (“Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the work-
place that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run 
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living 
can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”) (quoting Henson v. City 
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression 
in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 689–90 
(1997) (“A hostile work environment imposes serious discriminatory burdens on female employees 
and helps to maintain sexual segregation of many segments of the workforce by marking certain 
workplaces or certain levels of the workplace hierarchy off-limits to women. Similarly, harassment 
targeting racial minorities, such as persistent racial taunts, ridicule, or threats, retards progress 
toward racial integration and equality in the workforce and burdens the work lives of minority 
employees . . . .”); Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra note 89, at 1809 (“When women and mi-
nority employees suffer such intolerable abuse, the abuse both interferes with their ability to make 
a living, and creates barriers for them that others in the workplace do not have to overcome.”). 
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[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed 
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, 
for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense 
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscriba-
ble class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach 
of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for 
example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other 
words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition 
against sexual discrimination in employment practices.93 
Along the same lines, on multiple occasions the Court has made clear 
that the First Amendment poses no bar to laws that forbid gatekeepers’ 
statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only”94 
or “Jobs Of Interest to Men.”95 In so doing, the Court has identified 
these laws as exemplifying the government’s constitutionally permissi-
ble regulation of speech that enables the doing of something that the 
government has legitimately regulated.96 
Consider, for instance, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. 
Rights.97 There the Court held that the First Amendment permits Con-
gress to regulate certain conduct by requiring universities to provide 
military recruiters with the same access to campus facilities as they 
provide other employers—even though this law also regulated speech 
by requiring universities to send emails or post notices on recruiters’ 
behalf: 
 
 93 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 94 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 
547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 95 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973) 
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect employers’ statements of discriminatory pref-
erence in the form of advertisements of “Jobs—Male Interest”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (citing the facts in Pittsburgh Press as an 
example of commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its relationship to 
illegal commercial activity). 
 96 See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62–66. Note that laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory 
advertisements or other statements of discriminatory preference are almost as prevalent as laws 
that prohibit gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status; e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(c) (2012) (prohibiting housing providers from “indicat[ing] any preference, limitation, or 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin”); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “to print or publish or cause to be printed or pub-
lished any notice or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any preference, limita-
tion, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29 
U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment 
agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating 
to employment by such an employer or membership in [such an organization or] classification or 
referral . . . by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination, based on age.”); see also Norton, You Can’t Ask (Or Say) That, supra note 1, at 732–
33 (canvassing state and local laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory advertisements or 
other statements of discriminatory preference). 
 97 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates con-
duct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford 
equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may 
not say. . . . The compelled speech to which the law schools point 
is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of 
conduct, and “it has never been deemed an abridgment of free-
dom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely 
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried 
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”98 
As an illustration of speech that is unprotected because it “initiates” or 
“carries out” illegal conduct (in other words, speech that does something 
and not just says something), the Rumsfeld Court pointed to gatekeep-
ers’ speech that enables illegal discrimination: “Congress, for example, 
can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of 
race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign 
reading ‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be 
analyzed as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than con-
duct.”99 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court again offered “White Ap-
plicants Only” as an example of speech unprotected by the First Amend-
ment because it does something and not just says something.100 There, 
a 5-4 Court held that Vermont violated the First Amendment when it 
restrained the exchange of information (about doctors’ prescribing prac-
tices) that would inform disfavored but legal marketing practices (phar-
 
 98 Id. at 60–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). As 
the Court notes, speech can “initiate” or “carry out” illegal conduct; such is the case of threats, 
offers, agreements, statements of discriminatory preference, and other “situation-altering” state-
ments. In this Article, I use the terms “enable” or “facilitate” to describe these connections between 
certain speech and regulated conduct. The Court also notes the use of speech as “evidence” of a 
speaker’s illegal motive for its conduct, which describes a slightly different relationship between 
speech and illegal conduct, and one that is also endemic throughout the law. See Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (“The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evi-
dentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 125–26 (1993) (explaining that a letter 
saying, “You’re fired, because I won’t let blacks work here” is “simply evidence of what is unlawful, 
a discharge based on discrimination. Use of the letter to prove discriminatory motive is hardly 
unconstitutional even if the letter is speech.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a chal-
lenger can offer a decisionmaker’s question about a candidate’s protected class status as evidence 
of the ultimate decision’s discriminatory motive and thus its illegality. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1328 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t 
is reasonable to infer from the testimony presented at trial that the asking of the question [about 
disability status] set off a chain of events that ultimately led to Wal-Mart’s discriminatory conduct 
of refusing to hire [the plaintiff].”). 
 99 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62. 
 100 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). 
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maceutical companies’ marketing of brand-name drugs directly to doc-
tors).101 Yet in so holding, the majority distinguished unprotected 
speech that the government may restrict free from First Amendment 
scrutiny because of its close relationship to illegal conduct: 
It is true that restrictions on protected expression are distinct 
from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on non-
expressive conduct. It is also true that the First Amendment 
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct 
from imposing incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban 
on race-based hiring may require employers to remove “White 
Applicants Only” signs . . . .102 
In other words, “White Applicants Only” is unprotected because it de-
clares certain transactions and opportunities as off limits to protected 
class members. Precisely because of gatekeepers’ power, their speech in 
these transactional settings thus does something and not just says 
something.103 By deterring applicants from pursuing available opportu-
nities based on protected class status, gatekeepers’ statements of dis-
criminatory preference like “White Applicants Only” enable illegal dis-
crimination and thus can be regulated without triggering First 
Amendment scrutiny.104 
 
 101 Id. at 557. 
 102 Id. at 567; see also Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) 
(“[A] law requiring all New York delis to charge $10 for their sandwiches . . . would simply regulate 
the amount that a store could collect. In other words, it would regulate the sandwich seller’s con-
duct. To be sure, in order to actually collect that money, a store would likely have to put ‘$10’ on 
its menus or have its employees tell customers that price. Those written or oral communications 
would be speech, and the law—by determining the amount charged—would indirectly dictate the 
content of that speech. But the law’s effect on speech would be only incidental to its primary effect 
on conduct . . . .”); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) 
(identifying malpractice and informed consent requirements as examples of the government’s con-
stitutionally permissible “regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech”). 
 103 GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 244 (defining a situation-altering 
order as a statement “by someone in authority, concerning acts as to which his authority generally 
extends”). 
 104 See Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 652 
(6th Cir. 1991) (“Without the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain classes of 
potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location, effectively discriminating against 
these classes without running afoul of the FHA’s prohibition against discriminatory housing prac-
tices. Congress obviously recognized the key role housing advertisements play in potential real 
estate transactions and concluded that the regulation of real estate advertisements is war-
ranted.”); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e read [the Fair 
Housing Act’s bar on discriminatory advertisements] to describe any ad that would discourage an 
ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning 
and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 
787, 795 (1992) (explaining that law treats speech like “Whites Only Need Apply” as “‘discrimina-
tory practices’ and outlaw[s] them under federal and state civil rights legislation because they are 
more than speech”). 
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Once we understand why the First Amendment does not protect 
gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like “White Appli-
cants Only,” we can see the implications for other speech that enables 
illegal discrimination. Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ pro-
tected class status, like their statements of discriminatory preference, 
take place in an environment in which their speech does something and 
not just says something precisely because of their power in that trans-
actional setting. More specifically, these inquiries can both deter cer-
tain candidates from pursuing available opportunities and also elicit 
the information that makes illegal discrimination possible. First, be-
cause the gatekeeper’s query signals a preference for a term of the pro-
posed transaction where the speaker has the functional power to insist 
on that term, a gatekeeper’s inquiries about candidates’ protected class 
status deters certain listeners from pursuing important opportunities. 
Think, for example, of an employer’s questions about an applicant’s re-
ligion, HIV-status, or pregnancy. Just as is the case when a deci-
sionmaker announces its preference for “White Applicants Only,” these 
inquiries communicate certain opportunities as off limits to protected 
class members and are made by decisionmakers who have the power to 
enforce those limits. Second, gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ 
protected class status also make illegal discrimination possible by elic-
iting information that remains available, consciously or unconsciously, 
for later use in their decision-making about available opportunities. 
These inquiries do something rather than just say something because 
they enable the speakers to limit their targets’ opportunities through 
their power over the transaction, rather than through the power of their 
ideas. 
The next section explains how the Court’s modern commercial 
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activ-
ity, including commercial speech that enables illegal discrimination. 
C. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Commercial Speech 
Related to Illegal Activity, Including Commercial Speech Related 
to Illegal Discrimination 
By prohibiting employers, insurers, housing providers, lenders, 
and other gatekeepers from denying opportunities and services based 
on protected class status, antidiscrimination law regulates the use of 
certain information in determining the terms and conditions of commer-
cial activity (i.e., the exchange of money for labor, credit, housing, in-
surance, and more). And when legislatures forbid commercial actors 
from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making, those 
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actors’ inquiries about candidates’ protected characteristics then con-
stitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment 
because it facilitates illegal commercial activity.105 
1. Commercial speech related to illegal activity more generally 
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.,106 the Court held for the first time that the Free Speech 
Clause provides some protection for commercial speech, striking down 
Virginia’s law that forbade pharmacists from advertising their prescrip-
tion drug prices.107 The majority underscored the expression’s value to 
vulnerable prescription drug consumers like “the poor, the sick and par-
ticularly the aged,” observing that those consumers share an “interest 
in the free flow of commercial information[] that . . . may be as keen, if 
not keener by far, than [their] interest in the day’s most urgent political 
debate.”108 In so holding, the Court explained that free speech protec-
tions are “enjoyed by the appellees [i.e., the consumers] as recipients of 
the information, and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers them-
selves.”109 
Shortly thereafter, the Court again described commercial expres-
sion’s First Amendment value (and thus its protection from the govern-
ment’s regulation) as turning primarily on its ability to facilitate listen-
ers’ informed decision-making about legal activities. Under this 
framework, commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to 
illegal activity offers no constitutional value to listeners and is thus un-
protected from the government’s regulation, subject only to rational-ba-
sis review.110 As the Court explained in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission: 
 
 105 Despite the contemporary antiregulatory turn in its Free Speech Clause doctrine, the Court 
continues to apply this commercial speech framework. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 
1763–65 (2017) (discussing commercial speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regula-
tion of trademarks); Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (discussing commercial 
speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regulation of retailers’ communication about 
prices). 
 106 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 107 Id. (overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)). 
 108 Id. at 763. 
 109 Id. at 756. 
 110 See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1776 n.49 (“The Central Hudson approach demands a thresh-
old inquiry into whether the speech is misleading. Thus, misleading commercial advertisements 
are akin to legally obscene materials in that they are regulable under minimal rational basis scru-
tiny without regard to First Amendment standards or values. Indeed, misleading commercial 
speech is arguably simply not covered by the First Amendment.”); White, supra note 81, at 527 
(“False commercial speech falls outside the coverage of the First Amendment and can be regulated 
with impunity.”). 
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The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based 
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, 
there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public 
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of commu-
nication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or 
commercial speech related to illegal activity.111 
In contrast, accurate commercial speech about legal activity (like accu-
rate speech about prescription drug prices) is valuable to listeners, and 
thus the government’s regulation of such speech triggers First Amend-
ment suspicion in the form of heightened—that is, intermediate—scru-
tiny.112 
Although the Court has yet to offer a precise definition of commer-
cial speech, the term includes commercial advertising and other speech 
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”113 Because 
the speech that proposes a commercial transaction includes the speech 
involved in communicating and negotiating the terms and conditions of 
that transaction,114 the Court has recognized speech other than adver-
tisements as commercial for First Amendment purposes, like speech 
that communicates the price of goods and services.115 As legal scholar 
Felix Wu explains, “[w]hat makes speech commercial is the extent to 
 
 111 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (strik-
ing down governmental ban on electric utilities’ promotion of electricity consumption) (citations 
omitted). 
 112 Id.; see also id. at 562 (noting that the Court’s “decisions have recognized ‘the “com-
monsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an 
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). 
 113 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). 
The Court has also characterized commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 114 See Smolla, supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 115 E.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (characterizing New 
York law as a regulation of commercial speech because it regulated retailers’ communication of 
the price of goods and services); Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (char-
acterizing product demonstrations in campus dormitory rooms as commercial speech); Beeman v. 
Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 74–75 (Cal. 2013) (characterizing a regulation re-
quiring “prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize information on pharmacy 
fees and to transmit the information to their clients” as the regulation of commercial speech); Car-
rico v. City of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing a law prohibiting landlords 
from coercing tenants to vacate their homes through offers of payment, accompanied by threats 
and intimidation, as the regulation of commercial speech); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 
555 F.3d 996, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing the government’s regulation requiring carriers 
“to obtain opt-in consent from a customer before disclosing that customer’s information to a car-
rier’s joint venture partner” as regulating commercial speech); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (characterizing consumer credit reports as commercial speech). 
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which the speech should be understood to be part of a commercial trans-
action. Pricing information is quintessential commercial speech, be-
cause pricing is a key component of any commercial transaction.”116 
Recognizing that the employment relationship is a type of commer-
cial relationship in which a worker exchanges her labor and talent for 
pay, the Supreme Court has identified job advertisements as “classic 
examples” of commercial speech.117 Lower courts regularly apply this 
reasoning to conclude that employers’ recruitment efforts, interviews, 
and negotiations about the terms and conditions of employment also 
constitute commercial speech that initiates and completes commercial 
transactions.118 Along the same lines, gatekeepers’ inquiries about ap-
plicants’ protected characteristics—along with gatekeepers’ statements 
like “White Applicants Only”—take place in the context of communi-
cating and negotiating about potential commercial transactions.119 
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine provides that com-
mercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment when it is false, 
misleading, or “related to illegal activity.”120 In that case, such speech 
is entirely open to the government’s regulation subject only to rational-
basis scrutiny—as recounted in Part I, the Court has long recognized 
legislatures’ constitutional power to regulate commercial transactions, 
which includes their power to prohibit decisionmakers from enforcing 
discriminatory terms or conditions in providing opportunities and ser-
vices.121 And when a legislature exercises its constitutional power to 
prohibit certain commercial activity, speech that facilitates that now-
illegal activity loses its First Amendment value to listeners, and thus 
its constitutional protection. Examples include speech that advertises 
or inquires about the availability of goods and services that legislatures 
 
 116 Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 
631, 644 (2019). 
 117 Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385 (“Each [job advertisement] is no more than a proposal 
of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.”). 
 118 E.g., Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 
104 (2d Cir. 2017) (characterizing potential employers’ solicitation of day laborers as commercial 
speech because it involves advertisements and negotiations for work); Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whit-
ing, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); Nomi v. Regents for Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412, 417 
(D. Minn. 1992) (“[Military job] recruiting proposes a commercial transaction; the purpose of re-
cruiting is to reach an agreement under which services will be exchanged for compensation.”), 
vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 
S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2000) (concluding that speech asserting that a former employee was 
subject to, and in violation of, a non-compete agreement was commercial speech). 
 119 Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(concluding that employers’ inquiries about candidates’ salary history in the context of job appli-
cations and negotiations constituted commercial speech). 
 120 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980). 
 121 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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have prohibited, like drugs and drug paraphernalia, prostitution, and 
income tax evasion services.122 
As an illustration, the production and sale of any particular sub-
stance remains legal commercial activity unless and until a legislature 
chooses to make it illegal. Until that time, advertisements for, inquiries 
about, and negotiations over the price and availability of that substance 
constitute commercial speech related to legal activity, with the govern-
ment’s regulation of such speech subject to intermediate scrutiny. But 
once a legislature chooses to prohibit the production and sale of that 
substance (and recall that its regulation of such commercial activities 
generally triggers only rational-basis scrutiny123), advertisements for, 
inquiries about, and negotiations over the availability of that product 
then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First 
Amendment because of its relationship to what is now illegal activity. 
(To be sure, some listeners very much want to receive such information 
as potential purchasers of illegal drugs or illegal services—but once the 
legislature makes that activity illegal, that interest is no longer pro-
tected by the Constitution.) 
2. Commercial speech related to illegal discrimination more spe-
cifically 
Along the same lines, a characteristic does not become “protected” 
from private parties’ discrimination as a legal matter unless and until 
a legislature passes a statute prohibiting gatekeepers from relying on 
that characteristic in their decision-making. For example, gatekeepers’ 
discriminatory reliance on pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary 
history, etc.) in their decision-making does not become illegal unless 
and until a legislature enacts a statute to that effect.124 Upon such a 
 
 122 See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (characterizing the 
advertising of materials that advocated not filing federal income tax returns as unprotected com-
mercial speech related to illegal activity); Wash. Mercantile Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (characterizing drug paraphernalia advertisements as unprotected commercial speech 
related to illegal activities); New England Accessories Trade Assocs., Inc. v. City of Nashua, 679 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213 
(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Kan. Retail Trade Coop. v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); 
State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (characterizing advertisements for prosti-
tution as unprotected commercial speech related to an illegal commercial transaction); Washing-
ton v. Clark Cty. Liquor and Gaming Licensing Bd., 683 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1984) (same); see also United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (holding that offers to provide, and requests for, 
child pornography are unprotected by the First Amendment because the distribution and posses-
sion of child pornography is itself illegal). 
 123 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 124 This Article focuses on statutes that protect certain characteristics from discrimination by 
nongovernmental or governmental employers and other gatekeepers. Of course, apart from any 
statutory requirements, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to pro-
hibit the government from discriminating based on certain characteristics in its decisions. E.g., 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the government’s race-based segregation 
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statute’s enactment, however, gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ 
protected class status then constitute commercial speech that is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment because they relate to—that is, ena-
ble—the now-illegal activity of relying on those characteristics when 
making key decisions. 
Indeed, in Central Hudson itself, the Court offered gatekeepers’ 
speech that enables illegal job discrimination as an illustration of com-
mercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its re-
lationship to illegal commercial activity.125 More specifically, it cited its 
holding in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rela-
tions, a decision rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a local anti-
discrimination law that not only prohibited sex-based employment de-
cisions, but also prohibited gatekeepers’ publication of “any notice or 
advertisement relating to ‘employment’ or membership which indicates 
any discrimination because of . . . sex.”126 The Pittsburgh Press Court 
held that sex-segregated job advertisements constituted unprotected 
commercial speech because they proposed the illegal commercial trans-
action of discriminatory hiring. In so holding, the Court analogized the 
contested job listings (which consisted of columns headed “Jobs—Male 
Interest” and “Jobs—Female Interest”) to constitutionally unprotected 
advertisements for illegal drugs or prostitution.127 As it explained, “Dis-
crimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal 
commercial activity under the Ordinance . . . . The advertisements, as 
embroidered by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were 
likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions. Any 
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an or-
dinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the 
governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent 
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on ad-
vertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”128 In 
other words, advertising that “I’ve got a job for a man” or stating that 
“Only whites need apply” is just as related to illegal activity for com-
mercial speech purposes as advertising that “I’ve got cocaine for sale.” 
 
of public schools on equal protection grounds); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (strik-
ing down the government’s exclusion of women from the state’s Virginia Military Institute on equal 
protection grounds). 
 125 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 126 413 U.S. 376, 378 (1973). 
 127 Id. at 388 (“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to pub-
lish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be dif-
ferent if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned ‘Nar-
cotics for Sale’ and ‘Prostitutes Wanted’ rather than stated within the four corners of the 
advertisement.”). 
 128 Id. at 388–89. 
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All of these statements facilitate illegal commercial transactions. All 
thus do something, and not just say something. 
So too is the case of gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ reli-
gion, sexual orientation, pregnancy, prior pay, credit history, or other 
characteristics protected from discrimination by the relevant jurisdic-
tion. Asking an applicant if she’s pregnant (or HIV-positive, or Muslim) 
is not meaningfully distinguishable for these purposes from saying “No 
pregnant [or HIV-positive, or Muslim] people need apply,” as the query 
deters applicants based on protected class status and elicits information 
that facilitates illegal decision-making. 
The doctrinal recognition that the First Amendment does not pro-
tect commercial speech related to illegal activity thus separates the gov-
ernment’s constitutionally permissible interest in regulating commer-
cial transactions from the government’s constitutionally impermissible 
interest in censoring a message it disfavors. This insight also explains 
why laws regulating gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal discrimi-
nation (like laws regulating commercial speech related to illegal activ-
ity more broadly) do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny even though 
they target certain speech by certain speakers.129 As the Court has rec-
ognized, the First Amendment permits these distinctions because only 
certain speakers have the power to engage in the conduct that the leg-
islature has regulated. In other words, only employers and other gate-
keepers have the power to make illegally discriminatory decisions, and 
only some of their inquiries and statements enable that illegal con-
duct.130 
 
 129 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015) (stating that the govern-
ment’s content-based or speaker-based regulation of speech generally triggers strict scrutiny). But 
as many thoughtful commentators have observed, the Court’s First Amendment doctrine justifi-
ably includes numerous exceptions (including but not limited to its commercial speech doctrine) in 
which it upholds the government’s speaker- and content-based distinctions without applying strict 
scrutiny. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 80, at 695 (canvassing precedent to conclude that “free speech 
consequentialism, more than being ubiquitous, is in fact inevitable”); James Weinstein, Speech 
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2004) In summary, the popular view that all content-based re-
strictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless the speech falls within some un-
protected category is not an accurate snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. Speech is too ubiqui-
tous with too many real-world consequences for there to be any such rule. Rather, the strong 
presumption against content discrimination operates only within a limited (albeit extremely im-
portant) domain. 
 130 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (noting that the First Amendment 
permits the government to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like 
“White Applicants Only” that initiate or carry out illegal discrimination); Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment permits the government 
to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference that are incidental to the govern-
ment’s regulation of “commerce or conduct”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) 
(“[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against 
conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense 
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up 
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For related reasons, the Court’s commercial speech framework also 
explains why its decision in Sorrell is inapposite to antidiscrimination 
laws that restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ protected 
class status. Recall that Sorrell held unconstitutional a Vermont law 
that restricted the transmission of specific information (individual doc-
tors’ prescribing practices) to prevent that information’s use in disfa-
vored but legal choices (marketing brand-name pharmaceuticals to in-
dividual doctors).131 Contrast antidiscrimination laws that instead 
restrict gatekeepers’ questions that elicit specific information about in-
dividual candidates’ now-protected characteristics to prevent that in-
formation’s use in illegally discriminatory conduct.132 
Recall too Daniel Farber’s proposal for parsing the government’s 
permissible targeting of speech for its contractual functions from its im-
permissible targeting of speech because of the ideas expressed. We can 
be confident that the former is at work if the government’s regulatory 
interest in those statements or inquiries disappears when made by 
those who are not parties to a potential transaction.133 The antidiscrim-
ination provisions discussed herein apply only to speech by one party to 
a potential job, housing, or other transaction about the terms of that 
transaction because only that party has the power to engage in the reg-
ulated conduct. In other words, the government regulates these inquir-
ies because they do something and not just say something.134 
 
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for exam-
ple, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s 
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices.”) (citations omitted). 
 131 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578–79 (“The State may not burden the speech of others in order to 
tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”). 
 132 For a more accurate parallel to Sorrell in the antidiscrimination context, consider instead 
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, where the Court upheld a First Amendment 
challenge to a law that barred “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on real estate to prevent “panic” selling 
by whites who feared that the town’s racial integration would drive down property prices; such 
sales remained legal even though disfavored by the town. 431 U.S. 85, 85 (1977). Note that Lin-
mark predates Central Hudson; under the Central Hudson framework, the law at issue in Linmark 
would now be understood as a regulation of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity 
and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. The Court has generally rejected the government’s pa-
ternalistic regulation of speech for fear that listeners will make unwise, yet legal, decisions. But 
the antidiscrimination laws described in Part I apply to gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegally 
discriminatory transactions, and thus restrict speech that the First Amendment does not protect. 
 133 See Farber, supra note 84, at 400 (describing the government’s regulation of discriminatory 
job advertisements as “relat[ing] to the contractual function of the ads [as offers of employment], 
rather than to the suppression of the free flow of information”). 
 134 Furthermore, the limitations of after-the-fact enforcement of antidiscrimination laws mean 
that alternatives—like simply prohibiting reliance on (i.e., use of information about) protected 
class status in decision-making—will not effectively achieve the government’s objectives. Nor 
would prohibiting only inquiries made with the intent to inform illegal conduct: not only does ad-
vance screening of “innocent” inquiries from those related to illegal decisions pose an unmanage-
able challenge, but even “innocent” queries can deter applicants from continuing to seek the op-
portunity at stake and can elicit information about protected class status that remains available, 
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Contrast inquiries by a speaker who does not hold power over the 
listener: such inquiries that “do not accomplish a significant change in 
normative relations or other aspects of the listener’s environment” be-
cause they are “not accompanied by inducements or threats or made in 
circumstances where a positive response is obligatory.”135 Think, for in-
stance, of how the government’s antidiscrimination interest in ques-
tions about an applicant’s pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary 
history or other protected characteristic) evaporates when the question 
is asked by a friend or neighbor rather than by an employer or other 
transacting party. For these reasons, gatekeepers’ statements or inquir-
ies that are not “in connection with” or “with respect to” a regulated 
transaction do not implicate the government’s interest in the enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination law, and thus these laws appropriately do 
not extend to communications outside of the transactional context.136 
For instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s regulations limit only 
inquiries into protected class status made “in connection with a credit 
transaction,”137 Title VII regulations address similar inquiries only “in 
connection with prospective employment,”138 and the Fair Housing Act 
prohibits discriminatory statements “with respect to the sale or rental 
of a dwelling.”139 Gatekeepers (and everybody else) remain free to ex-
press any political, moral, religious, or other opinion outside the trans-
actional context through letters to the editor, testimony, lobbying, and 
more. As the Court emphasized in Pittsburgh Press, “Nothing in our 
holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to 
publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, 
the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex 
preferences in employment.”140 
Some may contest the closeness of the relationship between gate-
keepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics and gate-
keepers’ illegal reliance on those characteristics.141 For instance, some 
 
consciously or unconsciously, for later use in decision-making. See supra notes 12–21 and accom-
panying text. 
 135 GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 75, at 68. 
 136 See Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing the First Amend-
ment problem if the Fair Housing Act prohibited housing providers’ statements of discriminatory 
preference that did not relate “to a specific discriminatory and illegal transaction”); IMDB.com, 
Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, Cali-
fornia law that prohibited the general publication of truthful age-related information about those 
in the entertainment industry when the law did not regulate the conduct and speech of parties 
engaged in a commercial transaction). 
 137 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019). 
 138 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2002). 
 139 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000). 
 140 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973). 
 141 See Tung Yin, How the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Pre-Employment-
Offer Disability-Related Questions Violates the First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 118–19 (2001) 
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may argue that asking an applicant about her religion or whether she 
has a disability does not carry the same deterrent effect as saying “No 
Jews” or “No folks with disabilities need apply”—or that asking an ap-
plicant about her age or salary history does not mean that the gate-
keeper will rely on her answer to make hiring and compensation deci-
sions.142 (Note, however, that the challengers to Philadelphia’s salary 
history law acknowledged that they sought to rely on those answers to 
make hiring and compensation decisions.143) But the Court has never 
required that commercial speech related to illegal activity lead inevita-
bly and only to that activity to lose First Amendment protection. Con-
sider Pittsburgh Press, where the defendant argued that because sex-
segregated advertisements did not expressly deny employment to 
women, they were not inevitably, and thus sufficiently, related to illegal 
discrimination to lose First Amendment protection.144 The Court re-
jected this argument, emphasizing that listing job openings in sex-seg-
regated columns signaled that employers were “likely” to discriminate 
and thus would deter at least some women from applying for male-des-
ignated jobs (and vice versa).145 So too do gatekeepers’ inquiries about 
 
(accepting Pittsburgh Press’s analysis with respect to discriminatory advertisements while arguing 
that the ADA’s prohibitions on disability-related inquiries do not “automatically deter” certain 
applicants in the way that sex-segregated job advertisements do). 
 142 The Third Circuit denied the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce’s request to preliminarily 
enjoin both the reliance and the inquiry provisions of Philadelphia’s salary history law. Greater 
Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020). Although I agree 
with the appellate court’s decision to deny the injunctions, I disagree with the portion of its anal-
ysis where it declined to describe employer inquiries about prior pay as “related to” illegal activity 
even though reliance on the answer constituted illegal activity under Philadelphia’s law. There 
the appellate court mistakenly (in my view) asserted that contested speech must always, and only, 
be related to illegal conduct to lose First Amendment protection under Central Hudson’s frame-
work. Id. at 141–42. The court instead characterized the provision as regulating commercial speech 
about legal activity, applied intermediate scrutiny, and then found that the provision survived 
such scrutiny. Id. at 142–57. 
 143 See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 8 (“By 
prohibiting employers from inquiring about [or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary his-
tory law] denies them useful information for evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring 
process.”). 
 144 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388 (“The illegality in this case may be less overt [than adver-
tisements for the sale of illegal drugs] but we see no difference in principle here.”); see also id. at 
381 n.7 (recounting the defendant’s argument that sex-segregated advertisements simply reflected 
men’s and women’s relative interest in certain job categories and that women might find them 
helpful in their search for employment); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 & n.9 (1982) (describing ads marketing pipes and other paraphernalia 
as unprotected commercial speech related to the illegal sale of drugs even though those products 
could also have been used for lawful activity other than drug use); id. at 497 (“[T]he overbreadth 
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.”). 
 145 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389 (“The advertisements, as embroidered by their placement, 
signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring deci-
sions.”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implica-
tions of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 150–52 (1996) (observing that even if the Pitts-
burgh Press ads did not explicitly exclude women from applying for male-designated jobs, they 
made such applications substantially less likely). 
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candidates’ protected class status signal that the answers are likely to 
influence gatekeepers’ choices and deter some applicants—especially 
when we recall that once a jurisdiction has prohibited reliance on preg-
nancy or other characteristics in commercial transactions, there’s no 
constitutional value in commercial actors’ inquiries about those charac-
teristics. 
Indeed, both theory and doctrine have long recognized that the 
First Amendment provides no protection to the speech that enables il-
legal conduct even if that speech does not always accomplish such con-
duct. Speech that solicits, or conspires to engage in, illegal conduct is 
not protected by the First Amendment even though it doesn’t always 
lead to illegal conduct, as the solicitation may be rejected or the conspir-
acy may not succeed.146 For instance, the First Amendment does not 
protect A’s inquiry as to whether B has cocaine for sale or if B would be 
willing to eliminate A’s enemy for a certain price—even if B declines A’s 
offer or fails to deliver on a promised exchange. What matters is that 
those inquiries are likely to accomplish illegal conduct. For the same 
reason, the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ statement 
“White Applicants Only;” it is likely to deter nonwhite applicants even 
though it may not always succeed in so doing. 
Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status are 
especially likely to enable illegal discrimination (and thus lose First 
Amendment protection) when they do not elicit information that is val-
uable apart from its ability to inform illegal discrimination, or when 
that information is available through other means or in other settings 
that do not threaten to infect gatekeepers’ decision-making about spe-
cific candidates on illegal bases. Recall, for, example, that the challeng-
ers to Philadelphia’s law argued that salary history inquiries not only 
informed their hiring and compensation decisions, but also permitted 
them to identify applicants with unaffordable salary expectations and 
to learn about prevailing pay scales for certain jobs.147 But employers 
can and do obtain more accurate information about the market for 
wages through other, aggregate sources outside of negotiations with a 
specific applicant for a specific transaction.148 And employers can learn 
 
 146 See Kristina E. Music Biro et al., Solicitation generally, 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 153 
(Nov. 2019) (“Solicitation is complete once the request to join in a crime is made and is punishable 
irrespective of the reaction of the person solicited; therefore, the fortuity that the person solic-
ited does not agree to commit or attempt to commit the incited crime plainly should not relieve the 
solicitor of liability when otherwise he would be a conspirator or an accomplice.”); John Bourdeau, 
Nature and extent of liability—Liability of person joining existing conspiracy, 16 AM. JUR. 2D 
CONSPIRACY § 21 (Nov. 2019) (“One becomes a member of an existing conspiracy by knowingly co-
operating to further the object of the conspiracy. One may join a conspiracy by word or by deed.”). 
 147 See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 9. 
 148 See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“[M]any employers use compensation surveys to know pre-
cisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages.”); Joanne Sammer, Banning Salary 
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whether they can afford a specific applicant simply by telling her the 
job’s salary or by asking for her salary expectations—just as the ADA 
permits employers to ask applicants if they can perform a job’s functions 
with or without a reasonable accommodation while forbidding employ-
ers from asking applicants whether they have a disability.149 
In sum, legislatures regulate commercial activity when they pro-
hibit commercial actors from relying on certain characteristics in their 
decision-making, and those actors’ inquiries about candidates’ pro-
tected characteristics then constitute commercial speech that is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment because it facilitates illegal commercial 
activity—in other words, because it does something and not just says 
something. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS THAT REGULATE COMMERCIAL 
PARTIES’ SPEECH 
This Part briefly considers the commercial speech framework’s ap-
plication to antidiscrimination provisions that regulate commercial 
speech in ways other than those discussed in Parts I and II—in other 
words, in ways apart from forbidding gatekeepers’ discriminatory state-
ments of preference and inquiries about candidates’ protected class sta-
tus when reliance on the answer is illegal. As we’ll see, some statutes 
prohibit decisionmakers’ inquiries about applicants’ characteristics 
without forbidding decisionmakers from relying on those characteris-
tics in their decision-making. Other statutes require decisionmakers to 
disclose certain accurate information about the terms and conditions of 
available opportunities. Finally, some statutes forbid gatekeepers’ reli-
ance on certain protected characteristics for some reasons and not oth-
ers, and thus forbid gatekeepers’ inquiries for some purposes and not 
others. 
 
History Questions: A Game Changer?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/banning-salary-his-
tory.aspx [https://perma.cc/MPL9-YWP9]. When managers base salary offers on a combination of 
an applicant’s current salary and what the pay budget allows—rather than on what the market is 
paying for a given position, skills and experience—the hiring process is less likely to yield the best 
candidate. With no access to applicant salary information, employers have an opportunity to move 
toward a broader approach to hiring.”). 
 149 See PAYSCALE, supra note 49, at 7 (suggesting alternatives for employers like asking 
“[w]hat are your salary expectations?” or describing their pay range to applicants). Note that alt-
hough laws like Philadelphia’s bar employers from relying on an applicant’s prior pay for decision- 
making purposes, they permit employers to rely on, and ask about, an applicant’s salary expecta-
tions in their hiring and compensation decisions. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(d) (West 
2017) (allowing inquiries into “compensation expectations” so long as the employer does not inquire 
into “compensation history”). 
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An exhaustive treatment of these statutes is beyond the scope of 
this Article.150 Here, I simply show how the Court’s longstanding com-
mercial speech doctrine again provides the relevant analysis. Recall 
that this doctrine exemplifies a listener-centered approach to certain 
First Amendment problems by protecting commercial speech that fur-
thers listeners’ interests (like accurate commercial speech about lawful 
activity) while permitting the regulation of commercial speech that 
frustrates those interests (like false or misleading commercial speech, 
or commercial speech related to illegal activity)—in other words, by 
privileging listeners’ interests over commercial actors’ interests as 
speakers when their interests collide.151 The Court’s commercial speech 
doctrine itself thus relies on speaker- and content-based distinctions 
precisely because those distinctions are relevant to commercial expres-
sion’s potential for First Amendment harm and First Amendment 
value.152 
A. Antidiscrimination Laws That Regulate Decisionmakers’ Inquir-
ies About Certain Characteristics Without Prohibiting Reliance 
On Those Characteristics 
First, some laws prohibit or delay gatekeepers’ inquiries about cer-
tain characteristics without ultimately prohibiting gatekeepers’ reli-
ance on those characteristics. In other words, sometimes legislatures 
block (or delay) gatekeepers’ inquiries to candidates about certain char-
acteristics when gatekeepers’ use of that information is not illegal. For 
example, some states and localities have enacted “ban-the-box” laws 
 
 150 I explored related issues in Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 61 (urging that we 
understand employers’ speech about the terms and conditions of employment as both protected 
and regulated to the extent that it furthers or frustrates workers’ First Amendment interests as 
listeners). 
 151 See supra notes 106–23 and accompanying text; Wu, supra note 116, at 631–32 (“Commer-
cial speech doctrine cares primarily about informing consumers, and that is the lens through which 
courts should determine how much scrutiny to give to a commercial speech restriction. In commer-
cial speech cases, courts should not be applying the kind of speaker-focused approaches they would 
be using in cases involving noncommercial speech.”). 
 152 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (noting 
that its “decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, 
and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 
(1978)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992) (“When the basis for the content 
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscriba-
ble, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been 
adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment 
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. . . . [T]o take a 
final example, a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, 
because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving 
it of full First Amendment protection), is in its view greater there.”) (citations and internal refer-
ences omitted). 
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that “generally prohibit employers from inquiring about a job appli-
cant’s criminal record until later in the hiring process, such as after an 
initial interview or once a conditional employment offer is made” in 
hopes that employers will be more likely to hire qualified ex-offenders 
if they assess candidates before learning of any criminal record.153 
Because gatekeepers’ inquiries about characteristics that are not 
protected from discrimination do not enable illegal activity, they do not 
fall within Central Hudson’s categories of commercial speech that are 
entirely unprotected by the First Amendment. This means that the gov-
ernment’s restrictions of such inquiries must satisfy intermediate scru-
tiny. Recall Central Hudson’s holding that the government’s regulation 
of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity triggers a form 
of intermediate scrutiny because that speech has constitutional value 
for listeners: 
The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory 
technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation 
on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s 
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two 
criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state in-
terest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it pro-
vides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s 
purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as 
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the ex-
cessive restrictions cannot survive.154 
In assessing whether the government’s means directly advances its 
ends, the Court has applied Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to 
permit the government to rely on “studies[,] anecdotes[,] . . . history, 
consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” to justify its choice, emphasiz-
ing that the standard requires “a reasonable,” rather than a perfect, 
fit.155 Relatedly, the Court has also declined to require the government’s 
 
 153 Flake, supra note 45, at 1084. To be sure, some jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and 
inquiries about, certain arrest or other criminal records. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
And although, as discussed in Part I, many jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and inquiries 
about, applicants’ salary history, some prohibit inquiries about salary history without prohibiting 
reliance on such information in employment decisions. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.357 (West 
2017). 
 154 Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 564 (1980). 
 155 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555–56 (2001). There the Court considered a 
challenge to a state law that restricted the use of billboards to advertise tobacco products within 
100 feet of schools and parks to discourage young people from using tobacco. It found that the state 
had demonstrated a sufficiently direct link between tobacco advertising and minors’ tobacco use. 
Id. at 561. But it ultimately concluded that the law failed the narrow tailoring requirement be-
cause those restrictions operated as essentially a complete ban on advertising a product lawfully 
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regulation to be the “least restrictive” alternative, but instead requires 
“a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in propor-
tion to the interest served,’ that employs not necessarily the least re-
strictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the de-
sired objective.”156 In other words, in these settings the government’s 
regulation does trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Nevertheless, ap-
propriately designed antidiscrimination provisions that delay or block 
gatekeepers’ access to certain information about candidates where reli-
ance on that information is not directly prohibited may survive such 
scrutiny.157 
B. Antidiscrimination Laws That Require or Permit Certain Disclo-
sures 
Next, antidiscrimination laws sometimes require employers, hous-
ing providers, lenders, insurers, and other commercial actors to make 
certain accurate disclosures to expose or deter discrimination, or to 
achieve other equality goals. For example, as part of their efforts to 
ameliorate stubborn and unjustified pay disparities, some legislatures 
have enacted laws that require employers to disclose their pay scales 
and practices.158 These measures seek to address asymmetries in infor-
mation about pay, where employers know what they pay their own 
workers but workers generally don’t know what their colleagues are 
 
used by adults (due to urban density, for example, no space within the city of Boston would be 
available for tobacco billboards under the statute). Id. at 561, 565. 
 156 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478, 480 (1989) (“[This Court has] 
not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not ‘burden sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests . . . . and 
[the Court has] been loath to second-guess the Government’s judgment to that effect.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 157 See, e.g., King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that 
Fair Credit Reporting Act requirement that credit reports exclude outdated arrest record infor-
mation regulates accurate commercial speech and thus triggers Central Hudson intermediate 
scrutiny, and then upholding the provision under that scrutiny); see also Greater Phila. Chamber 
of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the city’s law pro-
hibiting employers’ inquiries about applicants’ salary history survived Central Hudson intermedi-
ate scrutiny); Lester-Abdalla, supra note 49 (proposing that salary history laws should trigger, and 
survive, intermediate scrutiny). 
 158 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(c) (West 2019) (requiring employers to provide information 
about their pay scales upon an applicant’s reasonable request); Rebecca Greenfield, Making Salary 
Information Public Helps Close the Gender Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-05/making-salary-information-public-helps-
close-the-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/5W7E-QHJP] (citing a study by Columbia University 
and University of Copenhagen researchers that found a seven percent reduction in the pay gap 
between men and women after Danish law required employers to disclose pay data by gender). 
209] DISCRIMINATION, SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 249 
paid.159 As legal scholar Sylvia Law observes, “[e]very story of a success-
ful challenge to the gender wage gap begins with a woman discovering 
that she is earning less than a male colleague who does similar, or less 
demanding, work.”160 Other examples of required disclosures for anti-
discrimination purposes include laws that require employers and other 
gatekeepers to disclose truthful information about applicants’ legal 
rights.161 
These sorts of disclosures have a long pedigree throughout the com-
mercial speech context more broadly, where the government routinely 
requires commercial actors to make certain accurate disclosures to in-
form and further listeners’ decision-making.162 Consumer protection 
law and securities law, for example, rely on an array of information-
forcing mechanisms to address informational asymmetries between 
speakers and their listeners.163 
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine supplies the rele-
vant First Amendment analysis. As it explained in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, “the extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of 
the information such speech provides.”164 For this reason, the Court has 
applied only deferential review to laws requiring commercial speakers 
 
 159 See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“In the U.S. labor market, information on wages and com-
pensation is decidedly asymmetric. Employees frequently do not know how their pay compares to 
comparable workers, either within or outside their firm, and are reluctant to seek this knowledge 
out of fear of retaliation, social norms, or general inertia. In stark contrast, many employers use 
compensation surveys to know precisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages. In 
other markets characterized by asymmetric information, the entity with more complete infor-
mation maintains a distinct advantage.”); Lobel, supra note 46, at 549 (“[A] central innovation of 
the new laws is to reverse information flows in the wage market. Efforts to eradicate wage dis-
crimination have failed in large part due to information asymmetries and difficulties in identifying 
and proving discrimination.”). 
 160 Sylvia A. Law, Income Disparity, Gender Equality, and Free Expression, 87 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2479, 2494 (2019). 
 161 See Norton, supra note 61, at 32–33. 
 162 See Leslie G. Jacobs, Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled Consent Speech, 29 J.L. 
& POL. 517, 522 (2014) (“This government regulatory power to require the disclosure of facts ma-
terial to informed consent is not limited to commercial contracts. Consent is a crucial element that 
renders many types of transactions legal and enforceable. Governments have always had the au-
thority to define the facts that must be communicated and the circumstances that must exist to 
create this critical element of consent.”); Andrew Tutt, Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,” 
and the First Amendment, 2017 BYU L. REV. 117, 148 (2017) (“Commentators have been puzzled 
for decades by the fact that some areas of intensely content-based speech regulation remain subject 
to, at best, modest First Amendment scrutiny. But a judicial concern for ensuring bargain fairness 
readily explains the lack of rigor. The purpose of the measures in question is to level the bargaining 
positions of the parties, thereby helping individuals to obtain a better deal in circumstances of 
significant information asymmetry.”). 
 163 See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2017) (“The law of consumer protection has long concerned itself with 
information and power asymmetries among market participants.”). 
 164 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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to make accurate disclosures to their listeners to protect those listeners 
from deception, upholding such requirements when they are “reasona-
bly related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers.”165 Lower courts have also often applied this deferential review to 
disclosure requirements intended to inform consumers even when the 
regulated commercial speakers have not engaged in deception.166 The 
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above167 that require truthful 
disclosures by commercial actors will generally survive this review. 
Despite its more recent antiregulatory turn, the Court has yet to 
repudiate Zauderer’s deferential review as applied to required commer-
cial disclosures.168 In any event, the disclosures described above can 
also satisfy Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard. As I’ve 
written elsewhere, “[G]overnment requirements that employers dis-
close truthful information about workers’ rights and other working con-
ditions can provide considerable value to workers as listeners while im-
posing little, if any, expressive costs. They thus can readily satisfy not 
only rational-basis scrutiny but also intermediate or even exacting scru-
tiny when appropriately drafted to achieve the government’s strong in-
terest in informing and protecting workers.”169 
Relatedly, note that some antidiscrimination laws that forbid gate-
keepers from asking candidates about their protected class status nev-
ertheless sometimes permit candidates to disclose that status to achieve 
equal opportunity. Think, for example, of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, which forbids employers from inquiring into workers’ disability 
status while permitting—indeed, encouraging—workers to disclose 
their disability status to explore possibilities for reasonable accommo-
dations.170 Think too of laws that protect workers from their employers’ 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 E.g., CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Zauderer analysis 
to permit the government to “compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the com-
pelled disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a substantial government interest, and involves ‘purely 
factual and uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or product provided”) (citations 
omitted); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n 
v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 167 See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 168 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (quoting 
Zauderer as permitting government to require commercial actors to disclose factual and uncontro-
versial information). 
 169 Norton, supra note 61, at 75–76; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech 
and the Consumer “Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2016) (urging that compelled 
commercial disclosures receive heightened scrutiny but concluding that many such disclosures will 
survive such scrutiny, especially when motivated by government’s substantial interests in con-
sumer protection or regulatory enforcement). 
 170 See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrim-
ination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 643 (2011) (“The ADA is, by and large, an antisubordi-
nation statute. It seeks to elevate the status of a particular historically disadvantaged group: peo-
ple with disabilities.”); id. at 646 (explaining that prohibiting employer inquiries about workers’ 
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punishment for sharing their salary information with other workers.171 
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, gatekeepers’ inquiries 
about disability or other protected characteristics are distinguishable 
from candidates’ disclosure of those characteristics when the former are 
related to illegal discrimination while the latter enable reasonable ac-
commodation and other equality goals.172 These measures change the 
dynamic from one where gatekeepers have all the information and 
power to one where applicants have some too. As noted above, these 
sorts of measures to address informational asymmetries between trans-
actional parties have a long pedigree in the commercial speech con-
text.173 
C. Antidiscrimination Laws That Permit Gatekeepers to Collect (And 
Sometimes Rely on) Information About Protected Characteristics 
Finally, some antidiscrimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect 
information about applicants’ protected class status in certain circum-
stances to achieve equality objectives. More specifically, some antidis-
crimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect data about applicants’ 
protected characteristics to assess the success of their equal opportunity 
efforts or to determine whether their selection practices have an ille-
gally disparate impact. For example, Title VII (unlike some other anti-
 
disability status while permitting workers to disclose their status helps achieve both anticlassifi-
cation and antisubordination goals). Legal scholar Bradley Areheart has advocated a similar ap-
proach to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in which gatekeepers would be forbidden 
from inquiring about applicants’ genetic information to prevent discrimination, but applicants 
could disclose such information when doing so enabled reasonable accommodation or other equal-
ity goals. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 706 
(2012). 
 171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(i) (making it unlawful for employers to forbid employees 
from talking about their pay with other workers); see also Lobel, supra note 46, at 590 (“Taken 
together, the salary history inquiry ban and salary co-worker inquiry protection also correct a long-
existing non-gender specific, double standard—employers often demand secrecy from their em-
ployees and usually do not reveal the pay scale of their employees when they interview but demand 
salary history.”). 
 172 See Cofone, supra note 8, at 165 (“[A possibility] for making this method compatible with 
affirmative action and other tools that address diversity concerns under an antisubordination logic 
. . . would be to condition the information flow instead of banning it directly. When dealing with 
explicitly diversity-concerned decision-makers, information could be released under the condition 
of a specific use: if active diversity measures are to be established.”); Roberts, Protecting Privacy 
to Prevent Discrimination, supra note 8, at 2168–69 (stating that this approach “capture[s] the 
best of both worlds[:] [i]ndividuals could maintain autonomy by deciding how and when to disclose 
information related to protected status, and potential discriminators would be unable to ask about 
protected status unless the inquiry were explicitly designed to accommodate or to cultivate diver-
sity”). 
 173 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 163, at 1631 (“The law of consumer protection has long 
concerned itself with information and power asymmetries among market participants.”). 
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discrimination statutes) specifically forbids disparate impact discrimi-
nation in addition to intentional discrimination,174 and the Supreme 
Court has interpreted Title VII to permit employers to consider candi-
dates’ race or gender as part of an affirmative action plan so long as the 
plan’s purpose mirrors that of Title VII and does not unnecessarily 
trammel the rights of nonbeneficiaries.175 For this reason, the EEOC 
explains: 
Employers may legitimately need information about their em-
ployees[’] or applicant[’s] race for affirmative action purposes 
and/or to track applicant flow [for purposes of complying with 
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions]. One way to obtain racial 
information and simultaneously guard against discriminatory 
selection is for employers to use separate forms or otherwise 
keep the information about an applicant’s race separate from the 
application. In that way, the employer can capture the infor-
mation it needs but ensure that it is not used in the selection 
decision.176 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Antidiscrimination law regulates commercial conduct when it pro-
hibits gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in setting the 
terms and conditions of employment and other transactions. As theory 
and doctrine both make clear, the First Amendment permits the gov-
ernment to restrict the speech that initiates or accomplishes this con-
duct—that is, speech that does something and not just says something. 
More specifically, this includes commercial actors’ speech that enables 
illegally discriminatory transactions, such as gatekeepers’ statements 
 
 174 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(i) (prohibiting an employer from using an employment prac-
tice that disproportionately excludes or disadvantages protected class members unless the em-
ployer can “validate” the practice — i.e., unless it can show that the practice is “job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity”). 
 175 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding county’s consideration 
of sex or race as a plus-factor in promotions to remedy substantial underrepresentation of women 
and people of color in traditionally segregated jobs); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding collective bargaining agreement’s dedication of a certain percentage of 
openings in training programs to African-American workers to break down longstanding patterns 
of racial hierarchy within those jobs). 
 176 Facts About Race/Color Discrimination, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm [https://perma.cc/27C7-5Y47]; see also Enforce-
ment Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions & Medical Examinations, EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (1995), www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html [https://p
erma.cc/U8E5-BN9S] (explaining that the ADA permits federal contractors to invite applicants or 
employees to voluntarily self-identify as individuals with disabilities for purposes of complying 
with federal law that requires federal contractors to engage in affirmative action that may require 
the collection of applicant data). 
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like “White Applicants Only” as well as inquiries about candidates’ pro-
tected class status. Because these inquiries enable illegal discrimina-
tion by deterring candidates based on their protected class status and 
by eliciting the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory 
decisions, the First Amendment poses no bar to the government’s regu-
lation of them. 
 
